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Polarization, which has been growing over the last few decades, refers to the
divergence between Democrats and Republicans. Polarization has been found to have a
number of negative consequences: it contributes to legislative gridlock, decreases trust in
government and institutions, and increases income inequality. Polarized partisan politics also
contribute to election of ideologically extreme candidates to office, which gives rise to a
concern that these candidates will not adequately represent a large segment of the population.
Examination of polarization is worthwhile because it may prove useful in mitigating these
negative effects. This dissertation primarily deals with psychological bases of polarization and
partisan bias. First, I examine whether people with certain psychological traits approach
partisanship in a more emotional, biased manner. Second, I examine whether the effects of
partisanship vary by the context (namely political vs. nonpolitical). Finally, I have a
methodological study on conjoint experimental design in political science. It examines how
different types of conjoint design affect subjects’ preferences.
More specifically, In the first chapter I examine whether some people are influenced
by their partisanship to a greater extent than others. In the increasingly polarized political
climate in the U.S. partisans tend to ascribe positive characteristics to co-partisans and
negative to opposing partisans. Group attachment partisan literature has long argued that
strength of one’s partisanship moderates this partisan bias. But are there other predictors that
explain people’s tendency to exhibit partisan bias? In this chapter I examine whether people’s
tendency to feel and understand emotions–Need for Affect (NFA)—is a predictor of partisan
bias. I find consistent evidence that judgments of partisans are affected by both, in-group and
out-group partisan bias. However, different subsets of the population have a different tendency
to exhibit the two forms of bias. Out-group partisan bias is mostly driven by individuals who
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score high on the NFA scale. Moreover, there is no evidence that those who score high on the
NFA scale exhibit in-group partisan bias. This finding is particularly significant for it shows
that contrary to social identity theory, in-group bias is not an automatic consequence of
identification with a group.
In the second chapter I examine whether the influence of partisan bias on people’s
evaluations varies by setting. Partisanship has long been known to be an influential force in
shaping people’s evaluations of political actors. More recent research has demonstrated that
the influence of partisanship extends to people’s decisions and evaluations in non-political
settings. However, it remains unknown how the influence of partisanship on people’s
behavioral judgments compares between the political and non-political settings. In this
chapter I experimentally manipulate the setting in which respondents evaluate candidates for
jobs, scholarships, internships and awards. I find that respondents’ tendency to exhibit
partisan bias (both in-group and out-group) is the same in both settings. I interpret these
findings through the lens of conflict extension theory. Namely, conflict between Democrats
and Republicans has spread from few policy issues to many, and eventually into non-political
settings. As this conflict spread, it did not abate in intensity. The current partisan polarization
among rank-and-file members is similar in intensity in the political and non-political setting.
In the third chapter I examine the use of conjoint experiments in political science. In
recent years they have been increasingly used in the discipline. However, political scientists
have predominantly relied on the most commonly used form of conjoint: forced-choice
conjoint (also referred to as choice-based conjoint). This reliance on one type of conjoint
leaves the question open of how different conjoint designs affect responses, and whether some
conjoint designs are more appropriate for some studies than for others. In this chapter I
examine these research questions. I find that forced-choice conjoint results in statistically
significant social desirability reporting for racial preferences, while other forms of conjoint do
not. This finding is particularly significant as it suggests that the most commonly used form of
conjoint is not appropriate for the study of sensitive topics. I also find that forced-choice
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CHAPTER 1: WHO IS DRIVING POLARIZATION? NEED FOR AFFECT (NFA)
AND HETEROGENEITY OF PARTISAN BIAS AMONG THE MASSES
Introduction
In their seminal work on voting behavior Campbell et al. (1960) discussed at length
how partisanship can be a source of bias by raising a perceptual screen over citizens’ minds.
However, the political landscape today (and our society at large) looks very different than it
did when these authors theorized about the nature of partisan bias. Mainly, polarization has
increased dramatically (Hetherington and Rudolph, 2015; Mason, 2018). Also, the
information revolution has brought about an era in which people’s attention is a commodity
(Davenport and Beck, 2001; Wu, 2017). Since attention is often effectively captured by
emotional appeals (Phelps, Ling and Carrasco, 2006; Yiend, 2010), emotional appeals are
ubiquitous in the current era.
As emotions came to occupy a more prominent place in our society, it is plausible that
individual-level factors that drive citizens’ behavioral judgments in this landscape (as opposed
to the old landscape) have changed as well. More specifically, people’s judgments and
behaviors might be shaped by their tendency to understand and process emotions–the Need
for Affect (NFA)–to a greater degree in the current environment. Consequently, in this
research I examine whether people’s NFA trait explains their tendency to show partisan bias.
Partisanship literature has surprisingly little to say about individual-level factors that
strengthen and diminish biases. Of course the strength of partisanship is one (Campbell et al.,
1960; Green, Palmquist and Schickler, 2002), but that’s a very obvious one (and by now well
established). Examining how people’s tendency to express partisan bias is moderated by NFA
will give us a more complete account of the nature of partisan bias. It will help to move the
discussion forward from a conversation about partisan bias that can be seen in the population
on average, to whether for some people partisanship biases their behavioral judgments to a
greater extent than for others.
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Polarization comes with a number of negative consequences. For instance, it
contributes to legislative gridlock (Binder, 1999; Jones, 2001), leads to decreased trust in
government and institutions (Hetherington and Rudolph, 2015; Banda and Kirkland, 2018),
and it leads to increased income inequality (McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal, 2016). More
polarized populace is also likely to elect ideologically extreme candidates to office, which
gives rise to a concern that these candidates will not adequately represent a large segment of
the population. Examination of whether for some people partisanship tends to bias their
behavioral judgments more than for others, might prove useful in mitigating the negative
consequences of polarization.
To examine whether people’s NFA trait is predictive of the size of partisan bias in their
behavioral judgments, I conduct a series of survey experiments. In these experiments I asked
respondents to evaluate candidates for jobs, a scholarship, an internship, and an award in
non-political setting. Respondents evaluated seven candidate profiles in total. For each
candidate profile respondents were assigned to evaluate a Democratic candidate, a Republican
candidate, or a candidate whose partisanship was not signaled. Since respondents answered
the same evaluative questions after each candidate profile, I use within-subjects analysis and
test how partisan bias functions across all seven experiments.
In line with previous literature I find that on average people tend to exhibit out-group
partisan bias. While there is less evidence for in-group partisan bias in previous literature, I
also find consistent evidence for in-group partisan bias. In regards to the main tests in this
study, I find little evidence that those who are low or in the middle of the NFA scale exhibit
out-group partisan bias. On the other hand, I find consistent evidence that those who score
high on the NFA scale bias evaluations of their opposing partisans in the negative direction.
This suggests that out-group partisan bias is mostly driven by people high on the NFA scale.
When it comes to in-group partisan bias, there is no evidence that those who score high on
NFA, but there is some evidence that those who score low or medium on the NFA scale
exhibit this form of bias.
This study makes a contribution to mass affective polarization literature by
demonstrating that there is significant individual-level variation in people’s tendency of to
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exhibit both, in-group and out-group partisan bias. I also contribute to social identity theory
by demonstrating that in-group bias is not an automatic consequence of group identification.
While on average identifying with a group results in in-group bias, when individual level
variation in in-group bias is explored, it is evident that not everyone who identifies with a
group exhibits this form of bias. Those who score high on the NFA scale do not show
in-group partisan bias in their evaluations.
Polarization
Scholarship on polarization offers considerable and consistent evidence that political
elites are currently polarized (Fleisher and Bond, 2001; Hetherington, 2001; McCarty, 2001;
Theriault, 2008; Theriault and Rohde, 2011; Shor and McCarty, 2011; McCarty, Poole and
Rosenthal, 2016). When it comes to the masses the picture is a bit more mixed. While some
argue that the masses are polarized (Levine, Carmines and Huckfeldt, N.d.; Jacobson, 2000;
Stonecash, Brewer and Mariani, 2003; Brewer, 2005; Levendusky, N.d.; Abramowitz and
Saunders, 2008; Abramowitz, 2010), others argue that there is little evidence of mass
polarization (Fiorina, Abrams and Pope, 2005; DiMaggio, Evans and Bryson, 1996; Evans,
2003).
In part the disagreement is over semantics, and in part over what evidence should be
indicative of mass polarization (Hetherington, 2009). Ideological distance between an average
Democrat and an average Republican has grown (Abramowitz and Jacobson, 2006;
Abramowitz and Saunders, 2008). While some scholars view this as evidence for mass
polarization, Fiorina asserts that this is better characterized as ‘party sorting’ (Fiorina, Abrams
and Pope, 2008). However, if one looks at policy preferences of most Americans, they are
largely moderate, which would suggest that the masses are not polarized (Fiorina, Abrams and
Pope, 2005; Evans, 2003). In addition to ideological distance and policy preferences, some
scholars have looked at the partisans’ growing tendency to harbor negative feelings towards
and view partisan opponents in a negative light (this is often referred to as affective
polarization) (Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes, 2012; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Haidt and
Hetherington, 2012). If one considers this as evidence for polarization, then there is consistent
evidence that the masses are increasingly polarized (Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes, 2012; Iyengar
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and Westwood, 2015; Haidt and Hetherington, 2012).
Technological Changes and Prevalence of Emotional Appeals
The information revolution has brought about an era in which people’s attention is
treated as a commodity (Davenport and Beck, 2001; Wu, 2017). For instance, advertisements
and products are designed to capture people’s attention (Pieters and Wedel, 2004). Social
network and technology platforms like Facebook and Netflix are also in the business of
capturing users’ attention (Wu, 2017; Vance, 2011). Attention, in turn, is often successfully
captured by emotional appeals (Phelps, Ling and Carrasco, 2006; Yiend, 2010). This explains
ubiquitousness of emotional appeals in the current era. It is of note that effectiveness of
emotional appeals is not limited to capturing attention. Emotional appeals have been shown to
increase user engagement on social network platforms (Lee, Hosanagar and Nair, 2018),
increase favorable attitudes towards a brand and brand consideration in advertising studies
(Mattila, 1999; Moore and Hutchinson, 1983), and increase political participation (Weber,
2013).
Moreover, consider emotional appeals in the current political media environment. As
of 2013, 47 million of Americans consumed the ‘outrage genre’ of news on the daily basis.
This style of reporting is characterized by catering to a niche partisan audience. These
programs are often led by a charismatic host who always seems to be in an outrage at the
opposing partisans regardless of the news being covered. They misrepresent events, mock and
vilify opponents, and even use insulting language (Berry and Sobieraj, 2013). In sum,
technological changes and trends in mass media underscore that emotional appeals are often
used as a tool, and consequently are prevalent in the current environment.
Social identity, Partisanship, and Partisan Bias
Social identity literature shows that respondents treat and evaluate in-group and
out-group members differently (Tajfel, 1970; Billig and Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel, 1974; Tajfel and
Turner, 1979, 1986). This finding holds, even when respondents are assigned to arbitrary and
meaningless groups to which they have no prior loyalty (Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel and Turner,
1979). Moreover, social identity theory argues that in-group bias is an automatic consequence
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of identification with a group (Tajfel, 1970; Billig and Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel, 1974; Tajfel and
Turner, 1979, 1986). Out-group bias, on the other hand is not always present (Struch and
Schwartz, 1989; Brewer, 1999). However, conditions like group competition and negative
feelings towards the out-group are associated with the presence of out-group bias (Doosje
et al., 1998; Mackie and Smith, 1998; Brewer, 2001; Mummendey and Otten, 2001).
Partisanship as a social identity literature views partisanship as a type social identity
(Green, Palmquist and Schickler, 2002). Hence, social identity theory informs expectations
for partisan bias. In particular, partisans should show in-group bias towards co-partisans, and
out-group bias towards opposing partisans. However, while social identity theory argues that
in-group (but not out-group) bias is an automatic consequence of identifying with a group, in
political science there is more evidence for out-group than in-group partisan bias (Iyengar and
Westwood, 2015; Gift and Gift, 2015; Banda, Carsey and Severenchuk, forthcoming). For
instance, Gift and Gift (2015) finds evidence that partisans discriminate against their partisan
opponents, but finds no evidence that they favor co-partisans in hiring practices. Similarly,
Banda, Carsey and Severenchuk (forthcoming) find consistent evidence that respondents
lower evaluations of people, places, and even inanimate objects when they are associated with
opposing partisans, but the authors find no evidence that respondents raise their evaluations
when objects are associated with co-partisans. While (Iyengar and Westwood, 2015) did find
evidence for in-group bias in one of the two strategic games respondents participated in, they
find consistent evidence for out-group bias in both games.
NFA and Partisan Bias
Psychologists have long recognized that people have stable personality traits that
moderate how they interact with the world around them (for review see Mondak, 2010).
Political scientists are starting to take heed of this (Mondak and Halperin, 2008; Mondak,
2010; Mondak et al., 2010; Gerber et al., 2013, 2011, 2012).
One personality trait that might be really illuminating is NFA. It describes people’s
disposition to feel and process emotions. That is, people who are high on NFA are more
motivated to feel emotions in comparison to those who are low on this scale (Maio and Esses,
2001). Individuals who are high on NFA have been shown to develop attitudes with strong
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affect (Maio and Esses, 2001), and exhibit an especially strong emotional responses to
disturbing political information (Ryan, Wells and Acree, 2016).
Moreover, NFA has been shown to affect information processing in learning.
Arceneaux and Vander Wielen (2013) conducted a study in which they exposed partisans to
consistently negative information about either Democrats or Republicans and examined how
people’s evaluations of the two parties changed. The authors found that individuals who score
high on NFA tend to process information more consistently with social psychological school
of partisanship (as opposed to the running tally model). In particular negative information
about the opposing party caused respondents to lower evaluations of the opposing party,
however, negative information about respondents own party, did not change their evaluations
(Arceneaux and Vander Wielen, 2013). It is of note that Arceneaux and Vander Wielen (2013)
also examined how people’s need to engage in effortful thinking–Need for Cognition
(NFC)–affects information learning. Though results were not as consistent as for NFA, overall
it seems that individuals high on NFC updated their evaluations more rationally in comparison
to people high on NFA (Arceneaux and Vander Wielen, 2013). The authors’ study examined
how NFA and NFC are related to changes in evaluations of the two parties as a consequence
of information learning. My study, in contrast, examines the extent to which NFA moderates
expressions of bias in initial evaluations. Also in contrast to the work of Arceneaux and
Vander Wielen (2013), this study includes a control group, which allows me examine the
relationship between NFA and in-group and out-group bias separately.
Bias in intergroup evaluations and behavior has been found to be strongly related to
emotions (Cottrell and Neuberg, 2005; Mackie, Devos and Smith, 2000). Similarly, Lodge
and Taber (2013) also argue that individuals engage in motivated reasoning because of
affective reaction to political stimuli. Maio and Esses (2001) argue that individuals who score
high on NFA might develop particularly strong attitudes towards social groups because
experiencing strong emotions towards these groups might be satisfying to these individuals.
Together, these findings suggests that NFA might moderate expressions of partisan bias. More
specifically, I expect:
H1: NFA is positively related with a tendency to exhibit in-group partisan bias.
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H2: NFA is positively related with a tendency to exhibit out-group partisan bias.
Study Design and Data
To test my hypotheses I asked respondents to evaluate the profiles of several
hypothetical candidates for various jobs, an internship, a scholarship, and an award. Each
candidate was randomly assigned to be a Democrat, a Republican, or not to have their
partisanship reported. Respondents were asked the same eight evaluative questions after each
profile, which allows me to employ within-subject analysis. This within-subject design has
two major advantages. First it allows me to estimate partisan biases across a range of settings.
Second, having seven trials per research participant drastically improves statistical power.
At the beginning of the survey respondents answered a number of questions including
seven items that were used to construct the NFA battery. These items, which can be viewed in
the Appendix A, were the ones that loaded high on factor analysis in the original NFA battery
developed by Maio and Esses (2001). These items were combined (by taking their average)
into a reliable index (α = .77). Respondents then were asked to evaluate candidates for a
chief financial officer, an activist, a secretary, a research assistant, a scholarship recipient, an
internship candidate, and a campus award candidate. These prompts were presented to
respondents in a random order. Figure 1 presents a sample profile for the CFO candidate.1
The rest of the profiles, which were designed in an analogous way, can be viewed by
interested readers in the Appendix A. These candidate profiles were deliberately minimalist in
their design. In this I follow Iyengar and Westwood (2015). Given the number of profiles that
respondents had to evaluate, this approach has the virtue of lowering cognitive burden on the
respondents.
As Figure 1 shows, in addition to partisanship, candidate profiles contained a number
of other attributes. The full list of these attributes along with the values they could take on is
presented in Table 1. The values for these attributes were randomly assigned. Because the
random assignment was independent of the partisanship random assignment, it is
1This profile was for Democratic candidates. For Republican candidates, “County Democratic
Headquarters” was replaced with “County Republican Headquarters.” For nonpartisan candidates “County
Democratic Headquarters” was replaced with “Voter Turnout Campaign.”
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Figure 1: Sample Profile for a CFO Candidate





Bachelor of Arts in Economics (GPA 3.42)
MBA (GPA: 3.72)
Relevant Work Experience:
Corporate accountant at Wells Fargo (5 years)




straightforward to estimate the effect of partisanship cues on evaluations. This property of the
design means that partisanship effects are best understood as an average across a wide range
of candidate background, rather than effects that might be specific to one particular
background.2
After each profile respondents were asked eight questions. Because I wanted to gauge
how partisan bias functions in a range of evaluations, I asked respondents to provide both
objective and subjective judgments. For instance respondents were asked to how
“Trustworthy,” “Ethical,” and “Open-minded” each candidate was. These are subjective
because information in the profiles does not inform logical inferences about these traits. All
other questions were more objective. All questions had five response options. Respondents
were asked “In general, how qualified do you think [candidate first name] is?” with response
options that ranged from “very qualified” to “‘very unqualified.” Respondents were also asked
“How likely are you to select [candidate first name] for this position?” with response options
that ranged from “very likely” to “very unlikely.” Finally, respondents were asked to rate
candidate on the following traits: “Competent,” Hard-working,” “Trustworthy,” “Ethical,”
“Intelligent,” “Open-minded.” Answer choices to these ratings ranged from “Extremely well”
2It is of note that varying attributes in these experiments is different in intent and function than varying
attributes in conjoint experiments. In conjoint experiments levels in an attribute are meant to be different from
each other. In these experiments, values of an attribute are approximately equal to each other. This is because
in conjoint experiments attributes are varied to evaluate the impact that different levels of an attribute have on a
behavioral judgment. Here, the purpose is simply to add variability in profiles.
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to “Not well at all.”
Table 1: Randomly Selected Attributes in Candidate
Profiles
Attributes and Their Values
First Names:
Michael, Steve, Mark, James, Brian, David, George, Daniel, Kevin,
Casey
Last Names:
Norton, Johnson, Harris, Miller, Davis, Anderson, Taylor,
Thompson, Allen, Smith
Volunteer activities:
American Heart Association, American Cancer Society, American
Diabetes Association, Lung Cancer Alliance, Red Cross, Local
Food Bank, Local Soup Kitchen
College/high school extracurricular activities:
Soccer club, Tennis club, Volleyball club, Cycling club, Ultimate
Frisbee club, Kickball club, Baseball club, Flag football club
Undergraduate GPAs:
from 3.12 to 3.17 by .01
High School and Graduate GPAs:
from 3.42 to 3.47 by .01
Results
The data in this paper was collected as part of a larger study on Survey Sampling
International (SSI) sample of U.S. adults. This sample was balanced on age, gender,
race/ethnicity, and region (West, Midwest, Northeast and South) to reflect demographics of
the U.S. population. The data was collected in March of 2019 and contains 691 respondents.
Table 2 shows sample breakdown by socio-demographic characteristics.
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African American 84 12.16
Hispanic 47 6.80
Asian 32 4.63












≥ 65 102 14.76
Education
< High School 27 3.91
High School/GED 181 26.19
Some college 167 24.17
2 year degree 58 8.39
4 year degree 170 24.60
Masters 61 8.83
Doctorate 12 1.74
Professional (JD/MD) 15 2.17
Party ID
Strong Democrat 117 25.62
Weak Democrat 102 14.76
Lean Democratic 52 7.53
Pure Independent 80 11.58
Lean Republican 45 6.51
Weak Republican 93 13.46
Strong Republican 142 20.55
Subjects 691
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I first present Average Treatment Effects (ATEs) for co-partisan and opposing partisan
treatment.3 The former represents the difference in respondents evaluations of a co-partisan
and a control group candidate. The latter represents the difference in respondents evaluations
of opposing partisan and control group candidate. Within-subjects analysis allows me to
examine my hypotheses across all seven candidate experiments at the same time by treating
responses to a particular evaluative question as the unit of analysis. More specifically, to
examine ATEs for the evaluative questions, I utilize a linear mixed effects model4 where I
include fixed effects for the candidate profile that respondents evaluated and random effects
for each respondent. The fixed effects for type of candidate profile accounts for different
baseline levels that candidates are evaluated at. This is necessary because candidate profiles
for different positions/awards can be perceived to have different level of a certain trait. For
instance, candidates being evaluated for a CFO position might all be perceived to be more
hardworking than candidates for a secretary position. The random effects for different
respondents has the effect of accounting for evaluation tendencies among respondents. This is
necessary because some respondents have the tendency to evaluate everyone more positively,
while others more negatively. Random effects also models clustering of evaluations by
respondent. Other than fixed and random effects this model includes a dummy variable for
co-partisan and opposing partisan treatment. The coefficients for these variables represent
ATEs. I present results of ATEs for different questions in Figure 2 below.5
As can be seen in figure 2 in six out of eight tests there is statistically significant
evidence that respondents evaluate their opposing partisans less favorably than equivalent
control group candidates. More specifically, respondents thought that candidates were 4.4%
less open-minded and were 3.8% less likely to select them for the relevant position or award
when the candidates were their opposing partisans. Respondents also thought that opposing
3Results in the body of the article include independent leaners in the partisan categories. I repeat these
analyses with leaners excluded from the partisan categories. The results do not substantively differ from those
presented here. They can be viewed by interested readers in the Appendix A in Figure 8 and 9.
4Mixed effects models are also often referred to as hierarchical models or multilevel models.
5The full regression models can be viewed in the Appendix A in Tables 10 and 11.
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Figure 2: Average Treatment Effects (ATEs)
Average Treatment Effects (ATEs) for “opposing partisan” treatment for eight evaluative questions is presented
in the left column. Similarly, ATEs for “co-partisan” treatment for the same questions is presented in the right
column. Points represent ATE estimates (calculated as the difference between average evaluation in the control
and treatment group), and horizontal bars are 95% confidence intervals.
partisans were 2.8% less qualified, 2.2% less trustworthy, 2.0% less ethical, and 1.7% less
intelligent than otherwise identical control group respondents (all significant at p < .05 level).
On the other hand, there was no statistically significant evidence that respondents thought that
their opposing partisans were less competent or hardworking than similar control group
candidates. When it comes to ATEs in the co-partisan treatment in six out of eight tests
respondents evaluated co-partisan candidates more favorably than similar control group
candidates. For instance, respondents thought that their co-partisans were 2% more
open-minded, 1.5% more trustworthy, and 1.8% more ethical than similar candidates in the
control group. Similarly respondents thought that their co-partisans were 1.5% more
intelligent, 2.3% more competent, and 1.9% more hardworking than similar control group
candidates (all significant at p < .05 level). However, there is no statistically significant
evidence that respondents were more likely to select or thought that their co-partisans were
more qualified than control group candidates.
Now that I have presented results for how partisans bias their evaluations on average, I
move on to examining heterogeneity of treatment effects. One way to assess heterogeneity of
treatment effects is to subset the data into groups based on ranges of pretreatment covariate of
interest, and calculate ATE for those ‘buckets’ of respondents (Horiuchi, Imai and Taniguchi,
2007). For this I divide my sample into three parts depending on where respondents fall on
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Figure 3: Conditional Average Treatment Effects (CATEs)
Conditional Average Treatment Effects (CATEs) by levels of NFA for “opposing partisan” treatment for eight
evaluative questions is presented in the left column. Similarly, CATEs for “co-partisan” treatment for the same
questions is presented in the right column. Points represent CATE estimates (calculated as the difference
between average evaluation in the control and treatment group), and horizontal bars are 95% confidence
intervals.
the NFA scale. Respondents who scored in the bottom 33.3 percentile were placed in the low
category. Respondents between 33.3 and 66.6 percentile were placed in the middle category,
and respondents scoring higher than 66.6 percentile were placed in the high category. Results
for estimated treatment effects conditional on the level of NFA are presented in Figure 3.6
Turning first to evaluating H2. Recall that when I looked at all respondents, in six out
of eight tests there was statistically significant evidence of respondents biasing their
evaluations negatively for opposing partisans. For respondents who score low on NFA in
6The full regression results can be seen by interested readers in the Appendix A in Tables 12–17.
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seven out of eight tests there is no evidence that they bias their evaluations negatively for
opposing partisans. The one exception being, respondents were 3.2% percent less likely to
select a co-partisan candidate than a similar control group candidate (significant at p < .05
level). For respondents in the middle of the NFA scale in six out of eight tests there is no
statistically significant evidence that they bias their evaluations negatively in comparison to
control group candidate. Respondents in the middle of the NFA scale did think that opposing
partisans were 2.9% less open-minded, and 2.6% less trustworthy (significant at p < .05
level). Turning to respondents who score high on the NFA scale, in all eight tests there is
statistically significant evidence that these respondents bias their evaluations in the negative
directions for their partisan opponents. Specifically, these respondents thought that opposing
partisans were 9.5% less open-minded, and they were 6.3% less likely to select them than
similar control group candidates. These respondents also thought that opposing partisans were
5.1% less qualified, 3.9% less trustworthy, 4.3% less ethical, 2.9% less intelligent, 3.8% less
competent, and 3.4% less hardworking than otherwise similar control group candidates (all
significant at p < .05 level). Overall results in this figure present consistent evidence for H2.
That is, NFA is positively related to the tendency to exhibit out-group partisan bias.7
Results for CATEs by NFA level for co-partisan treatment are presented in the bottom
row of Figure 3. Recall that H1 stated that NFA will be positively related to a tendency to
exhibit in-group partisan bias. For respondents low on NFA in six out of eight tests there is no
evidence of biasing evaluations favorably for co-partisans. These respondents did think that
co-partisans were 2.5% more open-minded, and 2.9% more hardworking (significant at p <
.05 level). For respondents high on NFA in all eight tests there is no statistically significant
evidence of biasing evaluations favorably for co-partisans. For respondents in the middle on
the NFA scale in five out of eight tests there is evidence of biasing evaluations favorably for
co-partisans. Specifically, respondents in the middle of NFA scale thought that co-partisans
were 3.2% more open-minded, 2.9% more trustworthy, 2.9% more ethical, 2.2% more more
7For opposing partisan treatment, I also test whether estimates in the Medium NFA and High NFA
categories are statistically significantly different than estimates in the Low NFA category. Results can be seen
by interested readers in the Appendix A in Tables 18 and 19. Estimates in the high NFA category are statistically
significantly different from estimates in the Low NFA category for “Open-minded,” “Ethical,” “Competent,” and
“Hardworking” ratings (at p < .05 level).
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intelligent, 4.5.% more competent, and 2.7% more hardworking than otherwise similar control
group candidates (significant at p < .05 level). Overall results for co-partisan treatment do not
provide support for H1. However, they do uncover non-linear nature of the relationship
between in-group favoritism bias and NFA. Namely, it is respondents in the middle of this
scale who tend to bias their evaluations favorably for their co-partisans.8
Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper I examine whether some individuals tend to bias their evaluations to a
greater extent than others. In line with previous literature I find consistent evidence that
partisans bias evaluations of opposing partisans in a negative direction (Iyengar, Sood and
Lelkes, 2012; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Gift and Gift, 2015; Banda, Carsey and
Severenchuk, forthcoming). I also find consistent evidence that partisans bias their evaluations
in a favorably for their co-partisans in comparison to similar control group individuals. As
aforementioned, previous literature offers less evidence that partisans show in-group partisan
bias. One possible reason why I find consistent evidence of in-group partisan bias is the
statistical leverage I get by applying within-subject analysis. For the analysis in Figure 2, my
sample size is 4,227, which is considerably bigger than most other studies dealing with the
subject.
I also examine heterogeneity of co-partisan and opposing partisan treatment by levels
of NFA. I find consistent evidence for H2. Namely, NFA is positively related with the
tendency to exhibit out-group partisan bias. In regards to heterogeneity of treatment effects
for co-partisan treatment, there is little evidence for those who score low on NFA and no
evidence for those who score high on NFA exhibit in-group partisan bias. On the other hand
there is some evidence for in-group partisan bias for those who score in the middle of the
NFA scale. Previous literature has examined how NFA moderates changes in respondents
8For co-partisan treatment I also test whether estimates in the Low NFA and Medium NFA category are
statistically significantly different from estimates in the High NFA category (I choose High NFA category as
a baseline because estimates in this category show the most consistent pattern in this treatment). Results are
presented in the Appendix A in Tables 18 and 19. Estimates in the Medium NFA category are statistically
significantly different from the estimate in the High NFA category for “Competent” (at p < .05 level), “Open-
Minded,” “Trustworthy,” and “Hardworking” ratings. Though for the latter three differences fail to reach
conventional levels of significance (significant at p < .10 level).
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evaluations of co-partisans and opposing partisans after they have been exposed to negative
information about the relevant group (Arceneaux and Vander Wielen, 2013). In examining
bias Arceneaux and Vander Wielen (2013) look at how these changes in evaluations (in
response to negative information) for co-partisans are different from changes in evaluations
for opposing partisans. While this shows overall bias, it leaves the question open of whether
discrepancy between co-partisans and opposing partisans arose due to in-group or out-group
partisan bias. The design of my study allowed me to examine how NFA moderates both forms
of bias. Such examination has proved fruitful for I found that NFA is positively related to
out-group partisan bias. However, NFA does not moderate in-group partisan bias in a linear
manner.
This study also contributes to social identity theory, which argues that in-group bias is
an automatic consequence of identification with a group (Tajfel, 1970; Billig and Tajfel, 1973;
Tajfel, 1974; Tajfel and Turner, 1979, 1986). Contrary to this assertion, I find that in-group
bias is not automatic. Though on average respondents exhibit in-group bias, when looking at
respondents conditional by level of NFA, it is evident that not all of them exhibit in-group
bias. Respondents who are high on NFA showed no evidence of in-group bias, and
respondents low on NFA only showed in-group bias in one out of eight tests. However, there
is considerable evidence for in-group bias among respondents who are in the middle range of
the NFA scale.
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CHAPTER 2: PARTISAN BIAS IN POLITICAL AND NON-POLITICAL SETTING
Introduction
The 2016 election brought partisan polarization to the forefront. After the election, a
number of news articles reported stories of ordinary Americans having a difficult time
navigating holidays with their families. Some have agreed to a ‘no politics rule’ during the
holidays for the sake of preserving peace. Others decided that a more appropriate course of
action was to confront or even antagonize family members with opposing political views.
Others still have decided that a better option was to avoid spending holidays with their family
all together (Tavernise and Seelye, 2016; Puglise, 2016; Scoby, 2018; Abber, 2016). It is
hardly surprising that partisanship affects peoples interactions at campaign rallies and
protests, but these stories illustrate that it can also affect people’s interactions outside of the
political arena. But how common is it for people to allow partisanship to influence
interactions outside the political arena, and how severe are the biases?
Experimental research shows that it is common for people’s partisanship to affect their
interactions with others in the non-political setting to some degree. For instance, partisanship
has been shown to affect choice of dating partners, approval of cross partisan marriages, and
perception of physical attractiveness (Phillips and Carsey, 2013; Huber and Malhotra, 2017;
Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes, 2012; Nicholson et al., 2016). Partisanship has also been shown to
affect economic interactions (McConnell et al., 2018), selection decisions for jobs and
scholarships (Gift and Gift, 2015; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Banda, Carsey and
Severenchuk, forthcoming), and even evaluation of inanimate objects merely associated with
one of two major parties (Banda, Carsey and Severenchuk, forthcoming). Together these
studies show that partisanship affects a wide range of behavioral judgments in the
non-political setting. This has often been interpreted as evidence of mass polarization
(Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes, 2012; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Banda, Carsey and
Severenchuk, forthcoming). Moreover, conflict extension theory argues that modern
polarization in America has been characterized by expansion of partisan conflict from a few
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policy issues to many (Layman and Carsey, 2002a,b; Layman et al., 2010), and eventually
from policy arena to non-political settings (Banda, Carsey and Severenchuk, forthcoming).
While there is plenty of consistent experimental evidence for the presence of partisan
conflict in the non-political setting, the question remains whether this conflict abated in
strength as it expanded from political to non-political setting. The answer to this question will
tell us whether partisans tend to compartmentalize their partisan identity to the political realm,
or whether in the currently polarized partisan politics, they tend to carry over their partisan
bias to non-political settings with the same intensity. The answer to this research question will
also help link older work that examined the influence of partisanship and partisan bias on
judgments in the political realm, with relatively newer work that examines the influence of
partisanship and partisan bias on judgments in the non-political setting.
As I discuss below, there are reasons why people’s behavioral judgments might be
affected by their partisanship to a greater degree in the political setting. Namely, political
settings might raise saliency of people’s political identity. However, there are also reasons
why in the current environment partisan biases might spill over from political to non-political
setting without abating in strength. Polarizations might have made people’s political identity
equally salient in the political and non-political sphere. The research herein develops
understanding of these possibilities.
To answer these research questions I conducted a series of survey experiments. In
these experiments, I randomly assigned respondents to evaluate candidates for jobs, a
scholarship, an internship, and an award in either political or non-political setting. I then
examine the extent to which respondents’ evaluations were driven by partisan considerations.
I find consistent evidence that respondents bias their evaluations of other partisans to
the same extent in the political and non-political setting. This holds for both, in-group
favoritism and out-group bias. This suggests that people’s political identity is equally salient
in both settings. It also shows that consequences of polarization on behavioral judgments of
ordinary partisans are the same in the political and non-political setting. Furthermore, I also
find that respondents evaluate individuals whose partisanship is not signaled similarly in the
political and non-political setting. This suggests that the political setting itself does not have a
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depressive effect on people’s evaluations.
Partisanship and Bias
Group attachment partisanship literature argues that identification with and a
psychological attachment to a political party leads to partisan bias in information processing
(Campbell et al., 1960; Green, Palmquist and Schickler, 2002). The social psychological
partisanship perspective argues that partisanship serves as a perceptual screen through which
individuals evaluate the political world. In particular, because of this perceptual screen
individuals tend to see what is favorable to their party. The stronger the partisan attachment
“the more exaggerated the process of selection and perceptual distortion will be” (Campbell
et al., 1960, p. 133).
In their work on partisanship as a social identity, Green, Palmquist and Schickler
(2002) updated the social psychological perspective by utilizing developments in social
identity research (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel and Turner, 1979). The authors depart from the social
psychological perspective on the notion of perceptual screen; hence the answer to why
partisanship causes biased information processing is slightly different. They argue that while
partisans differ in the way they assess the same candidates and policies, when they are
exposed to new political information, they update their evaluations in the same direction. For
this reason, the authors reject the idea that partisanship is a perceptual screen that makes
individuals select information favorable to their party, and ignore information unfavorable to
their party (Green, Palmquist and Schickler, 2002). Instead, the authors assert that partisans
tend to exaggerate positive qualities of in-groups and negative qualities of out-groups. While
this might seem similar to Campbell and his colleagues’ (1960) notion of perceptual screen,
the difference here is that in Green and his colleagues’ work partisan bias results from the
tendency to exaggerate, as opposed to a tendency to select information that benefits one’s own
party.
It is noteworthy that in the political setting, it is difficult to disentangle the effects of
partisan bias and other considerations like policy preferences or values (for a detailed
discussion see Krehbiel, 1993; Bartels, 2002; Fowler, n.d.). Fowler (2004) reviews the
evidence of partisan influence (as opposed to policy preferences) on vote choice and argues
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that it is inconclusive. On the other hand, Bartels (2002) looks at the changes in evaluations of
Democrats and Republicans in response to new information and finds evidence for partisan
bias. Also, partisans tend to perceive economic indicators like unemployment and inflation
differently depending on which party is in power, which is also indicative of partisan bias
(Bartels, 2002).
Social Identity and Bias
Green and his colleagues’ (2002) articulation of how group attachments bias
evaluations is consistent with social identity literature. This body of work shows that mere
identification with a group is enough to cause in-group favoritism, though not always
out-group bias (Tajfel, 1970, 1978; Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Brewer and Brown, 1998; Billig
and Tajfel, 1973). However, group competition (condition present between the two parties) is
often enough to cause out-group bias (Tajfel, 1970, 1978; Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Billig and
Tajfel, 1973). These two forms of bias can take on different forms. For instance, individuals
can exaggerate and enhance positive qualities (in-group favoritism) and exaggerate the
negative qualities (out-group derogation) (Brewer and Brown, 1998). This is the type of bias
that is emphasized by Green et al. (2002). In-group favoritism can also manifest itself in the
form of preference for fellow group members (Billig and Tajfel, 1973). In short, social
identity theory asserts mere identification with in-group will result in bias (Tajfel, 1970, 1978;
Tajfel and Turner, 1979). This bias is expected to be there regardless of context as long as
individuals identify with a group and can categorize others as in-group or out-group members.
Experimental research in political science supports the notion that people’s decisions
in the non-political setting are biased by partisanship (Banda, Carsey and Severenchuk,
forthcoming; Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes, 2012; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Gift and Gift,
2015). Partisanship bias has been shown to affect hiring and scholarship selection decisions
(Gift and Gift, 2015; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Banda, Carsey and Severenchuk,
forthcoming), perceived attractiveness of and evaluation of potential dating partners (Huber
and Malhotra, 2017; Nicholson et al., 2016), approval of marriage across partisan lines
(Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes, 2012; Phillips and Carsey, 2013). Partisanship has also been found
to affect economic interactions (McConnell et al., 2018), and even evaluation of inanimate
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objects merely associated with one of two major parties (Banda, Carsey and Severenchuk,
forthcoming). Together this scholarship indicates that people’s evaluations are not merely
objective assessments, but rather, in part, are biased by partisanship.
It is noteworthy that in political science there is more evidence for out-group than
in-group partisan bias. For instance, Banda, Carsey and Severenchuk (forthcoming) find
consistent evidence that partisans evaluate objects less favorably when they linked with
opposing partisans, but no evidence that respondents bias evaluations favorably when they are
associated with co-partisans. Iyengar and Westwood (2015) as part of a larger study,
examined how in-group and out-group bias affects players’ allocation decisions in strategic
games. They found evidence for out-group bias for both games, but evidence for in-group
favoritism in only one game. The authors concluded that discrimination against the out-group
is based more on out-group animosity than in-group favoritism (Iyengar and Westwood,
2015).
Hypotheses
The are two distinct mechanisms which might cause partisans to evaluate others
differently in the political and non-political setting. The first mechanism might increase the
magnitude of partisan bias in the political setting by increasing the saliency of the political
identity. Saliency of people’s identity has long been theorized by social identity scholars to be
positively related with bias in judgments (Oakes, 1987; Gaertner et al., 1993; Haslam et al.,
1999). Research shows that information environment can affect identity salience (Oakes,
1987; Gaertner et al., 1993; Haslam et al., 1999). It is very plausible that respondents are
reminded of their political identity more frequently in the political setting (whether internally
or externally) and as such their partisan identity is made more salient in the political setting.
It is important not conflate identity salience and identity importance. Perhaps because
these concepts are often highly correlated, they are often conflated (and hence used
interchangeably) in social psychological literature (Morris, 2013). Nonetheless, identity
importance and salience are theoretically distinct concepts, and their correlation varies across
contexts (Morris, 2013; Brenner, Serpe and Stryker, 2014). In the context of this research,
strength of partisanship and strength of partisanship as a social identity refer to identity
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importance.While identity importance should not change across settings, it is plausible that
identity salience can change from the non-political to the political setting.
Some previous scholarship differentiates between in-group and out-group bias. If the
political setting does in fact raise saliency of people’s partisan identity, I expect that both
forms of bias will increase in magnitude in the political setting. This can be expressed as the
following two hypotheses.
H1: Respondents will give more favorable evaluations to co-partisans in the political setting
in comparison to evaluations of co-partisans in the non-political setting.
H2: Respondents will give less favorable evaluations to opposing partisans in the political
setting in comparison to evaluations of opposing partisans in the non-political setting.
Alternatively, it is also plausible that people will bias their evaluations of co-partisans
and opposing partisans to the same extent in the political and non-political setting. Scholars
generally agree that political elites are more polarized today than a few decades ago
(Theriault, 2008; Shor and McCarty, 2011; Poole and Rosenthal, 1997; Bond and Fleisher,
2000). In regards to the masses, some argue that polarization has increased (Fiorina, Abrams
and Pope, 2005, 2008), while others maintain to the contrary (Abramowitz, 2010; Brewer,
2005; Levine, Carmines and Huckfeldt, N.d.; Jacobson, 2000; Stonecash, Brewer and
Mariani, 2003; Levendusky, N.d.). Nonetheless, there is consistent evidence of partisan
conflict among rank-and-file members in the non-political setting, which is indicative of the
presence of affective polarization among the masses (Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes, 2012; Iyengar
and Westwood, 2015; Gift and Gift, 2015; Banda, Carsey and Severenchuk, forthcoming).
Conflict extension theory argues that partisan conflict has spread from a few policy issue to
many (Layman and Carsey, 2002a,b; Layman et al., 2010), and eventually into non-political
settings (Banda, Carsey and Severenchuk, forthcoming). If strength of this conflict did not
abate as it spread from political to non-political settings, then as a result of this conflict
people’s political identity in the non-political setting should be just as salient as it is in the
political setting. While we have consistent evidence for the presence of partisan conflict in the
non-political setting we do not know how it relates to partisan conflict in the political setting.
If in the current polarized climate, partisan conflict and bickering are just as intense in the
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non-political setting as they are in the political setting, partisans should bias their evaluations
in both settings similarly.
There is another mechanism that might cause respondents to evaluate people
differently in the political and non-political settings. People might view the political setting
more negatively, which should have a depressive effect on evaluations. There is some
suggestive evidence that people view political settings more negatively than non-political
settings. Specifically, Klar and Krupnikov (2016) find that people perceive neighborhoods
with non-political lawn signs more attractive than neighborhoods with political signs. If this is
the case, political setting might have a depressive impact on objects evaluated in it. It is
noteworthy that while identity salience is hypothesized to affect the magnitude of partisan
bias, the effect of political setting here is theorized to affect baseline evaluation level. If the
political setting does depress baseline evaluation level, its influence should manifest itself in
evaluations of co-partisans, opposing partisans, and individuals whose partisanship is not
signaled. However, the clearest test for the presence of this influence on respondents’
judgments can be performed by comparing evaluations of individuals whose partisanship is
not signaled in the political and non-political setting. This expectation can be expressed as the
following hypothesis.
H3: Respondents will give less favorable evaluations to nonpartisan individuals in the
political setting in comparison to evaluations of nonpartisan individuals in the non-political
setting.
Study Design
To test the aforementioned hypotheses I conducted a series of experiments.
Specifically, I asked respondents to evaluate candidates for the position of chief financial
officer (CFO), an activist, a secretary, a research assistant, a scholarship recipient, an
internship candidate, and a campus award candidate (presented to respondents in a random
order). Each respondent evaluated a total of seven candidates. Each candidate was randomly
assigned to have a Democratic cue, a Republican cue, or no party cue. At the beginning of the
study respondents were randomly assigned to evaluate all seven candidates in either political
or non-political setting condition.
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After being presented with each candidate prompt, respondents answered eight
evaluative questions. Respondents answered the same evaluative questions after each
candidate profile, which allows me to use within-subjects analysis. There are two chief
advantages to this design. It allows me to test my hypotheses across a range of settings, and
seven trials per respondent considerably increases statistical leverage.




Internship on Capitol Hill.
...Marketing and Communications
Internship in Silicon Valley.
...secretary position at a State
Representative’s office.
...secretary position at a College
Dean’s office.
...community activist position at a
local political non-profit
organization.
...community activist position at a
local non-profit organization.
...a research assistant position at a
research organization focused on
public policy.
...a research assistant position at a
research organization focused on
effective philanthropy.
...student award at a local state
university...given to students who
have successfully gotten peers
involved in local elections.
...student award at a local state
university...given to students who
have successfully gotten peers
involved in philanthropy.
...scholarship is awarded to students
who want to study political science,
and go into career in politics after
college...
...scholarship is awarded to students
who want to study communication,
and go into career in public relations
after college...
...chief financial officer (CFO)
position at a city government.
...chief financial officer (CFO)
position at a local business.
Before being presented with the first candidate prompt, respondents were shown the
following instructions.
Imagine that the hiring/award committee has asked you to help with the candidate
selection process. You will be presented with profiles of seven candidates. Each profile will be
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for an individual being considered for a different position or award. The computer software
will randomly select and present you with a candidate for each position or award.
After being presented with each candidate profile, you will be asked a series of
questions in order to evaluate the candidate. Please examine each candidate profile carefully,
and answer corresponding questions to the best of your ability.
Figure 4 shows a sample profile for the internship candidate that was shown to
respondents in the non-political setting condition.9 Respondents assigned to the political
setting received the same prompt except “in Silicon Valley” was replaced with “on Capitol
Hill.” Summary of political and non-political cues for all seven candidate prompts can be seen
in Table 3. Sample profiles for all seven experimental tasks can be viewed by interested
readers in the Appendix B.
Figure 4: Sample Profile for the Internship Candidate
















In addition to partisanship, candidate profiles had a number of other attributes that
were randomly assigned. This adds realism to the candidate profiles. Since the assignment of
these attributes is random, their effect on the outcome variable, on average, is the same in both
conditions (political and non-political setting). Candidates’ first names were selected from the
following generic American male names: Michael, Steve, Mark, James, Brian, David, George,
9Figure 4 shows a sample profile for a Democratic candidate. For a Republican candidate, “College
Democrats” was replaced with “College Republicans.” For a candidate with a nonpartisan cue, “College
Democrats” was replaced with “Voter Turnout Drive.”
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Daniel, Kevin, and Casey. Last names were selected from the following common American
last names: Norton, Johnson, Harris, Miller, Davis, Anderson, Taylor, Thompson, Allen,
Smith. Once selected, first names and last names were combined to form a candidate’s full
name. It is noteworthy that since this is initial examination of how partisanship bias functions
in the political and non-political setting, I decided to restrict my exploration on race and
gender variables. However, future research could examine how partisan bias in both settings
interacts with gender and race.
Volunteer activities and college activities (where applicable) were randomly selected
from a list of such activities. The only exception to this is when volunteer activity or college
activity was used to signal partisanship of the candidate (non-partisan cue, Democratic cue, or
Republican cue). Volunteer activities were randomly selected from the following: American
Heart Association, American Cancer Society, American Diabetes Association, Lung Cancer
Alliance, Red Cross, Local Soup Kitchen. College and high school extracurricular activities
were randomly selected from the following: Soccer club, Tennis club, Volleyball club,
Cycling club, Ultimate Frisbee club, Kickball club, Baseball club, Flag football club.
Moreover, undergraduate GPAs were randomly selected from a uniform distribution ranging
from 3.12 to 3.17 (by .01). Where applicable high school and business school GPAs were
randomly selected from a uniform distribution ranging from 3.42 to 3.47 (also by .01).
After being presented with a particular candidate prompt, respondents were asked the
following questions. “In general, how qualified do you think [candidate first name] is?”
Responses to this question ranged from “very qualified” to “very unqualified.” Respondents
were also asked “How likely are you to select [candidate first name] for this position?”
Answer choice for this question ranged from “very likely” to “very unlikely.” Respondents
were also asked “When it comes to future performance in this position, how well do each of
the following words or phrases describe [candidate first name]?” For this question respondents
were asked to rate candidate on the following traits: “Competent,” Hard-working,”
“Trustworthy,” “Ethical,” “Intelligent,” and “Open-minded,” with answer choices for these
ratings ranging from “Extremely well” to “Not well at all.” All of the questions above were
measured on a five-point scale.
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Results
I collected the data for this study on a Survey Sampling International (SSI) sample
of U.S. adults. This sample was balanced on age, gender, race/ethnicity, and region (West,
Midwest, Northeast and South) to reflect demographics of the U.S. population. The data was
collected in March of 2019 and contains 1,367 respondents. Of these 691 were assigned to
the non-political condition and 676 were assigned to the political condition. Table 4 shows
sample breakdown of respondents’ socio-demographic characteristics by setting.
Since respondents answered the same evaluative questions for each candidate profile I
am able to utilize within-subject analysis. More specifically I utilize a linear mixed effects
model10 where I hold fixed effects for the seven candidate profiles and random effects for each
respondent. The fixed effects for type of candidate profile accounts for different baseline
levels at which different candidates are evaluated at. This is necessary because candidate
profiles for different positions/awards can be perceived to have different levels of a certain
trait. For instance, candidates being evaluated for a CFO position might be perceived to be
more hardworking than candidates for a secretary position. The random effects for different
respondents is necessary to account for different evaluation tendencies among respondents.
That is, some respondents have the tendency to evaluate everyone more positively, while
others more negatively. Random intercepts for respondents also models clustering of
responses by respondent (there are multiple evaluations for each respondent). Finally,
within-subjects analysis allows me to treat response to each evaluative question (DV) as a unit
of analysis as opposed to treating each subject as a unit of analysis.
Moreover, I model respondents’ evaluations as a function of whether they evaluated
a candidate prompt of a co-partisan or partisan opponent. Both of these are dummy variables
with control group candidate prompts being the baseline. I also include a dummy variable
for whether respondents were assigned to the political setting condition, and an interaction
between this variable and co-partisan and partisan opponent variables. While respondents’
10Mixed effects models are also often referred to as hierarchical models or multilevel models.
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Table 4: Demographic Characteristics of the Respondents
Setting Non-political Political
Number % Number %
Race
White 512 74.10 500 73.96
African American 84 12.16 82 12.13
Hispanic 47 6.80 45 6.66
Asian 32 4.63 45 5.18
Native American 3 0.43 5 0.74
Other 13 1.88 7 1.04
Gender
Male 293 42.40 308 45.56
Female 392 56.73 364 53.85
Other 6 0.87 4 0.59
Age
18–24 90 13.02 106 15.67
25–34 137 19.83 111 16.42
35–44 114 16.50 104 15.38
45–54 112 16.21 148 21.89
55–64 136 19.68 111 16.42
≥ 65 102 14.76 96 14.20
Education
< High School 27 3.91 17 2.51
High School/GED 181 26.19 174 25.74
Some college 167 24.17 179 26.48
2 year degree 58 8.39 58 8.58
4 year degree 170 24.60 158 23.37
Masters 61 8.83 56 8.28
Doctorate 12 1.74 10 1.48
Professional (JD/MD) 15 2.17 24 3.55
Party ID
Strong Democrat 117 25.62 163 24.11
Weak Democrat 102 14.76 84 12.43
Lean Democratic 52 7.53 56 8.28
Pure Independent 80 11.58 101 14.94
Lean Republican 45 6.51 57 8.43
Weak Republican 93 13.46 93 13.76
Strong Republican 142 20.55 122 18.05
Subjects 691 676
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answers to questions that are used as dependent variables (the likelihood of selection or
evaluation of candidates on different traits) were recorded on a scale ranging from 1 to 5, I
rescale these variables to range between 0 and 1. This allows for a more intuitive
interpretation of the impact of independent variables on dependent variables. It is also of note
that the dependent variables were coded such that higher values indicate more favorable
evaluation.
Table 5: Candidate Evaluations in Non-political and Political Setting
Select Qualified Trustworthy Ethical
Co-partisan 0.011 0.014∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.017∗∗
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Partisan opp. −0.038∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Political setting −0.002 −0.0004 −0.015 −0.010
(0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
Co-partisan −0.001 −0.009 −0.005 −0.001
× Political setting (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
Political opp. 0.018 0.011 −0.001 0.0004
× Political setting (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
Constant 0.698∗∗∗ 0.648∗∗∗ 0.666∗∗∗ 0.658∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Observations (N) 8,302 8,302 8,302 8,302
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
I present results for candidate evaluations in Tables 5 and 6.11 The constant term in the
11In this table I exclude pure independents from the analysis. This allows me to compare partisans’
evaluations’ of neutral candidates with their evaluation of co-partisan and opposing partisan candidates. Also,
in these tables I include independent leaners into partisan categories. This allows me to take advantage of most
of my data. However, one might argue that since this research deals with partisan identity and partisan bias, I
should not include those who are not willing to identify with the tribe in partisan categories. The question really
comes down to whether leaners are closet partisans (Keith et al., 1992). If they are, they should act just like
partisans and their inclusion is not problematic regardless of lack fo public association with a political party on
their part. On the other hand, it is possible that leaners differ from weak and strong partisans in their tendency to
exhibit bias towards the party that they lean towards and the party they lean away from. To alleviate this concern,
I repeat the analysis in these two tables while excluding leaners from partisan categories (see Appendix B). The
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tables represents an average evaluation (between 0 and 1) for candidates with no partisan cue.
Six out of eight coefficients for the “Co-partisan” variable are positive and statistically
significant. This indicates that as a general rule, respondents give more favorable evaluations
to co-partisans in comparison to the same individuals whose partisanship is not signaled.
Across all respondents and evaluations of all candidate prompts, however, such partisan
favoritism is substantively minor. For instance, respondents thought that their co-partisans
were 1.5% more trustworthy, 1.7% more ethical, 1.5% more intelligent, 2.0% more
open-minded, 2.3% more competent, and 1.9% more hardworking than the same control
group candidates (all significant at p < .05 level).
Table 6: Candidate Evaluations in Non-political and Political Setting
Intelligent Open-minded Competent Hardworking
Co-partisan 0.015∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Partisan opp. −0.017∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗ −0.012 −0.007
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Political setting −0.014 −0.004 −0.017 −0.008
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
Co-partisan 0.002 −0.015 −0.007 −0.014
× Political setting (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Political opp. 0.008 0.006 0.008 −0.005
× Political setting (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Constant 0.670∗∗∗ 0.645∗∗∗ 0.663∗∗∗ 0.675∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Observations (N) 8,302 8,302 8,302 8,302
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
results do not substantively differ from the ones presented here. More specifically, when independent leaners
are excluded from the partisan categories I find no evidence for H1 or H2. Partisans do not evaluate their co-
partisans more positively, or opposing partisans more negatively in the political setting. When it comes to H3, in
seven out of eight tests I find no evidence that political setting has a depressive effect on respondents evaluations.
The one exception being, respondents thought that control group subjects were 2.4% less competent in the
political than non-political setting.
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I also find consistent evidence that respondents evaluate their partisan opponents more
negatively than individuals whose partisanship they do not know. Coefficients for the
“Partisan Opponent” variable are negative and statistically significant in six out of eight cases.
For instance, respondents were 3.5% less likely to select a partisan opponent, and thought that
partisan opponents were 2.8% less qualified, 2.2% less trustworthy, 2.1% less ethical, 1.7%
less intelligent, 4.4% less open-minded (all significant a p < .05 level). A careful reader might
notice that when both are significant, the magnitude of out-group partisan bias is bigger than
in-group partisan bias. This is in line with the literature on negative partisanship that argues
that partisans are more motivated by the dislike of partisan opponents than a like for
co-partisans (Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Abramowitz and Webster, 2016, 2018). It’s also
of note that coefficients in table 5 and 6 show how much more positive respondents evaluate
co-partisans or how much more negatively they evaluate opposing partisans in comparison to
candidates whose partisanship was not signaled. The discrepancy between how respondents
evaluate co-partisans and partisan opponents is bigger in size as it is comprised of both
in-group and out-group bias. Overall, in line with previous research I find consistent evidence
of partisan bias (Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes, 2012; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Gift and Gift,
2015; Banda, Carsey and Severenchuk, forthcoming).
Moving on to testing hypotheses of this study. H1 and H2 expected that respondents’
partisan bias (towards co-partisans and partisan opponents) will be intensified in the political
setting. Whether respondents evaluate co-partisans more favorably in the political setting, can
be seen by the coefficients on the interaction term “Co-partisan × Political setting.” Similarly,
whether respondents exhibited more bias towards partisan opponents in the political setting
can be determined by looking at the coefficients on the interaction term “Partisan opp. ×
Political setting.” Across all eight evaluative questions the coefficients on these interaction
terms are never statistically significant. In other words, respondents do not evaluate their
co-partisans more positively, or partisan opponents more negatively in the political setting
than they do in the non-political setting. This suggests that people’s partisan identity is just as
salient in the non-political setting as it is in the political setting. If partisan conflict is
indicative of polarization, than polarization among rank-and-file Democrats and Republicans
31
is just as intense in the non-political and the political setting.
Recall that H3 posited that respondents will evaluate candidates whose partisanship is
not signaled less favorably in the political setting in comparison to non-political setting. This
hypothesis can be tested by looking at whether coefficients for the “Political setting” term in
Tables 5 and 6 are statistically significant. In all eight tests these coefficients are not
statistically significant. That is, I find no evidence for this hypotheses. This indicates that
political setting itself does not have a depressive impact on respondents’ evaluations.
Discussion and Conclusion
In this study I find consistent evidence for in-group and and out-group partisan bias.
That is, respondents tend to evaluate co-partisans more positively, and opposing partisans
more negatively than candidates without a partisan cue. Moreover, in all eight of my tests I
find that the magnitude of in-group partisan bias does not vary between political and
non-political setting. Similarly, I find consistent evidence that the magnitude of out-group
partisan bias does not vary between political and non-political setting. Moreover, I find no
evidence that the political setting itself has a depressive effect on respondents’ evaluations.
This finding seems to be in contrast to Klar and Krupnikov (2016) who found that people find
neighborhoods with political yard signs less attractive than neighborhoods with non-political
signs.
While previous literature provides consistent evidence for out-group partisan bias,
there is less evidence for in-group partisan bias. One possible reason I was able to find
consistent evidence for both is the statistical leverage I was able to achieve by applying
within-subject analysis. Moreover, the magnitude of out-group partisan bias was usually
larger in magnitude than in-group partisan bias. This finding is consistent with the literature
on negative partisanship that asserts that behavior of the American public is increasingly
driven by views of the opposing party as opposed to one’s own party (Iyengar and Westwood,
2015; Abramowitz and Webster, 2016, 2018).
Conflict extension theory states that modern polarization in America has been
characterized by a spread of partisan conflict. First, this conflict spread from a few issues to
many (Layman and Carsey, 2002a,b; Layman et al., 2010), and eventually to non-political
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settings (Banda, Carsey and Severenchuk, forthcoming). Previous research shows consistent
evidence for the presence of partisan conflict in non-political settings (Gift and Gift, 2015;
Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes, 2012; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Banda, Carsey and
Severenchuk, forthcoming). In this research I contribute to conflict extension theory by
showing that as this partisan conflict spread from political to non-political setting it did not
abate in intensity. Currently, the intensity of conflict among rank-and-file Democrats and
Republicans is the same in the the political and non-political setting. This research also
contributes to mass affective polarization literature by showing that consequences of
polarization for the masses are the same in both settings. Also, by examining partisan bias in
the political and the non-political setting, I link older research that examined partisan bias on
evaluations of actors in the political setting and relatively newer research which examines the
effects of partisan bias in the non-political setting. My results suggest that currently, findings
of the effects of partisan bias in one setting should generalize to the other setting.
It is hardly surprising that partisan conflict among the masses is intense in the political
setting. However, after the 2016 election some Americans found it hard to navigate holidays
with the family because of opposing political viewpoints. The results of this study
demonstrate that partisan conflict is equally intense in both settings. As such, we should not
be surprised that partisan identity of ordinary Democrats and Republicans is affecting their
everyday relationships.
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CHAPTER 3: CONJOINT EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN IN POLITICAL SCIENCE:
THE IMPACT OF CONJOINT TYPE ON SUBJECTS’ PREFERENCES
Introduction
Conjoint experiments were originally developed in the 1970s in marketing (Green and
Rao, 1971; Green, Krieger and Wind, 2001). While typical experiments allow researchers to
estimate the effects of one treatment, conjoint experiments allow researchers to
simultaneously manipulate multiple components of a treatment. Researchers are then able to
make causal inferences about the impact of these components on response. Conjoint
experiments also allow researchers to compare the relative influence of different components
of a treatment on the outcome variable (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto, 2014). Today
conjoint experiments continue to be widely used in marketing to examine consumer
preferences and develop products (Green, Krieger and Wind, 2001; Raghavarao, Wiley and
Chitturi, 2011).
In recent years conjoint experiments are increasingly used in political science to study
a wide variety of topics. For instance, conjoint experiment have been used to study
preferences in immigrant traits (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014; Ward, 2019), gender norms
for politicians (Eggers, Vivyan and Wagner, 2018; Teele, Kalla and Rosenbluth, 2018),
preferences in political leaders (Carnes and Lupu, 2016; Auerbach and Thachil, 2018),
discrimination in welfare inquiries (Hemker and Rink, 2017), the impact of information
environment and issue preferences on voting (Peterson and Simonovits, 2018; Peterson,
2017), preferences for tax policy (Ballard-Rosa, Martin and Scheve, 2017), political
segregation of communities (Mummolo and Nall, 2017), and how the public defines terrorism
(Huff and Kertzer, 2018). All of these studies were conducted in recent years in just the three
leading political science journals.12
While there are technically many forms of conjoint experimental design, political
12These journals are American Journal of Political Science, American Political Science Review, and Journal
of Politics.
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scientists have predominantly relied on the most common form of conjoint
design–forced-choice conjoint (also commonly referred to as ‘choice-based conjoint’) (Green,
Krieger and Wind, 2001). In other words, it seems that in borrowing this powerful technique,
political scientists simply borrowed the type of conjoint that is widely used in marketing.
However, this leaves the question of how different forms of conjoint design affect subjects’
responses. It is of greater importance to examine this question in political science than in
marketing, because subjects’ preferences in political science are subject to considerations like
partisanship, ideology, social desirability, and social norms. Preferences that are driven by
these considerations can not be treated analogously to additional attributes of a product. As
such, it is important to examine how different components of conjoint design affect subjects’
preferences. It is plausible that some types of conjoint design will be more appropriate for the
study of some topics, and other forms of conjoint design for others.
In this study I examine the impact that different aspects of conjoint experimental
design have on subjects’ responses by conducting a study on college admissions. I present
respondents with conjoint candidate profiles and ask them selection and rating questions for
these candidates. More specifically, I examine whether presenting respondents with pairs of
conjoint profiles (paired conjoint), in comparison to presenting them with a set of single
conjoint profiles (single conjoint) affects responses. Also, in the paired conjoint condition, I
examine whether forcing respondents to select one of the profiles (forced-choice or
choice-based conjoint), in comparison to asking them a selection question about each profile
affects subjects’ responses.
I find that respondents’ preferences on the basis of race and partisanship were the
same regardless of whether they were assigned to the paired conjoint or single conjoint
condition (when separate questions were asked for each profile). In the paired conjoint
condition, forcing respondents to pick one of the profiles resulted in statistically significant
social desirability reporting on the basis of racial preferences, while other forms of conjoint
did not. This finding is particularly significant because it suggests that forced-choice conjoint
is not appropriate for the study of sensitive topics. Forcing respondents to pick one of the two
profiles (in the paired conjoint), also resulted in statistically significantly higher measures of
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partisan bias. When it comes to objective qualifications of candidates, my findings are more
mixed. Single conjoint condition resulted in higher estimated effects for some GPA ranges,
but not for SAT percentiles. In the paired conjoint condition, forcing respondents to pick one
of the candidates, increased estimated effects for some SAT percentiles, but not for GPA
ranges.
The Use of Conjoint Experiments in Political Science
The use of conjoint experiments is rapidly growing in political science. First, since
2017 the three leading journals in political science published ten articles that used conjoint
experimental design. From 2014 to the end of 2016 there were just four. This is in comparison
to zero articles featuring conjoint experiments, in the same journals, from 2000 to 2013.
When looking at top 20 political science journals (according to Google Scholar’s
h5-index), a similar trend emerges. From the beginning of 2017 to May 5th 2019, 35 articles
published in these journals used conjoint design. From 2014 to the end of 2016, eight articles
published in these journals used conjoint experimental design, and from 2000 to 2014 no
articles in these journals utilized conjoint experiments. For a detailed summary of these
findings see Table 7.
Even though the use of conjoint experiments is rapidly growing in recent years, the
use of conjoint experiments in political science is predominantly limited to the most popular
form of conjoint design–forced-choice conjoint. Case in point, out of these 43 articles using
conjoint experiments between 2014 and beginning of 2019, 34 articles utilized forced-choice
conjoint.13 This form of conjoint design involves presenting respondents with pairs of profiles
with multiple randomized attributes and asking respondents to select one of the two conjoint
profiles (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto, 2014).
However, scholars have pointed out that at times it might be appropriate to use other
forms of conjoint design. For instance, in her examination of how political signals affect
judicial nominations, Sen (2017) decided to present respondents with profiles of judges one at
the time (single conjoint) because, as the author argued, this is how candidates are presented
13Ten of these articles, in addition to the forced-choice question, included a rating question for each profile.
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Abrajano, Elmendorf and Quinn (2018) Yes
Arnesen, Duell and Johannesson (2019) Yes
Atkeson and Hamel (2018) Yes
Auerbach and Thachil (2018) Yes
Badas and Stauffer (2019) Yes
Ballard-Rosa, Martin and Scheve (2017) Yes
Bansak et al. (2018) Yes
Bechtel, Genovese and Scheve (2016) Yes Yes
Bechtel, Hainmueller and Margalit (2017) Yes Yes
Berinsky et al. (2018) Yes Yes
Bueno (2018) Yes Yes
Carnes and Lupu (2016) Yes
Chilton, Milner and Tingley (2017) Yes
Crowder-Meyer et al. (2018) Yes
Eggers, Vivyan and Wagner (2018) Yes
Franchino and Negri (2018) Yes Yes
Franchino and Segatti (2019) Yes
Gallego and Marx (2017) Yes
Goggin, Henderson and Theodoridis (2019) Yes
Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) Yes Yes
Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto (2014) Yes
Hansen, Olsen and Bech (2015) Yes
Häusermann, Kurer and Traber (2019) Yes Yes
Hemker and Rink (2017) Yes
Continued on next page
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Horiuchi, Smith and Yamamoto (2018) Yes
Huff and Kertzer (2018) Yes
Kirkland and Coppock (2018) Yes Yes
Leeper and Robison (2018) Yes
Matsuo and Lee (2018) Yes
Mummolo (2016) Yes
Mummolo and Nall (2017) Yes
Oliveros and Schuster (2018) Yes
Ono and Burden (2018) Yes




Strebel, Kübler and Marcinkowski (2019) Yes Yes
Teele, Kalla and Rosenbluth (2018) Yes
Vivyan and Wagner (2016) Yes
Ward (2019) Yes Yes
Werner (2019) Yes




Total = 44 34 10 6 4
FC, Paired Conjoint stands for Forced-choice, Paired Conjoint. St. is an abbreviation for study.
This table summarizes the use of conjoint experiments in the top 20 journals in political science from 2000
to May 5th, 2019.
to the public. Moreover, Hemker and Rink (2017) also used single conjoint design in their
study of welfare discrimination against minorities. Presumably this was to make fictional
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requests for information the authors sent out to bureaucrats seem legitimate.
There is another reason why different conjoint types might be more appropriate for the
study of different research questions in political science. While in marketing ’attributes’ in the
conjoint profiles usually refer to different characteristics of a product, in political science
’attributes’ in the conjoint profiles can refer to characteristics of people or policies.
Expression of preferences (based on the attributes in conjoint profiles) in political science can
be affected by considerations of gender, race/ethnicity, social desirability, and social norms.
Hence, while application of a powerful tool developed in marketing–conjoint experiments–has
facilitated new contributions to political science, it is worth examining how different aspects
of conjoint design might affect respondents’ preferences. For instance, preference on the basis
of race/ethnicity might be subject to social desirability pressures, which might make some
forms of conjoint design more appropriate than others. Hence, in this study I contribute to our
understanding of what types of conjoint designs are appropriate for the study what research
questions.
Since this is an initial exploration of how different aspects of conjoint design might
affect expression of respondents’ preferences, I decide to focus on two aspects of conjoint
design. First, I examine whether presenting respondents with a set of single conjoint profiles
in comparison to pairs of conjoint profiles affects respondents’ expression of preferences. It is
plausible that this aspect of conjoint design might affect respondents’ answers because
presenting respondents with a pair of profiles implicitly encourages them to compare the two
profiles (Hainmueller, Hangartner and Yamamoto, 2015). I also explore whether forcing
respondents to pick one of the profiles, as opposed to asking them selection question about
each profile affects their responses. When respondents are forced to select one of the two
profiles they are asked to make trade-offs, which might encourage zero-sum thinking.
Zero-sum thinking, in turn, might affect respondents’ preferences.
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Study Design and Data
To examine how different aspects of conjoint experimental design affect subjects’
responses, I conducted a study on college admissions.14 In this study I present respondents
with profiles of college applicants, and ask questions about the strength of these applicants
and whether they would recommend them for admissions. I randomly assign respondents to
either paired conjoint or single conjoint condition. Respondents in the former were presented
with ten pairs of conjoint profiles. Respondents in the latter condition were presented with
and asked questions about 20 single conjoint profiles. In both conditions respondents
evaluated 20 candidates.
College applications often include information about applicants race/ethnicity, and
objective qualifications such as test scores and grade point averages. Occasionally students
also include information that signals their political leanings. How conjoint experimental
design affects expression of preferences based on these attributes is of interest to scholars
studying a variety of subjects in political science, which makes college admissions a
particularly fitting setting for this study.Since racial preferences are subject to social
desirability pressures (Mendelberg, 2001; Huddy and Feldman, 2009; Weaver, 2012; Iyengar
and Westwood, 2015), how conjoint design affects them might be of interest not just for race
scholars but everyone who studies preferences that might be subject to social desirability
pressures. How partisan preferences are affected by conjoint design might be of interest to
scholars studying affective polarization and partisan bias. To my knowledge this is the first
study that examines partisan bias with the use of conjoint experiments. Finally, when conjoint
experiments are used to study preferences of people (for instance candidates, or immigrants),
these profiles typically include objective qualifications of these individuals. As such, how
these are affected by conjoint design is also of interest to scholars.
Table 8 presents an example of a pair of profiles that could be shown to respondents in
14Respondents were presented with the following prompt as an introduction: “Imagine that Office of The
Undergraduate Admissions at a flagship state university wants your help with making admission decisions. As
part of this process, in this survey, you will be presented with a number of profiles of high school seniors and
asked to evaluate them. Please review these candidate profiles carefully and answer associated questions to the
best of your ability.”
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Table 8: Sample Candidate Profiles in Paired Conjoint Condition
Candidate A Candidate B
Name Lukas Novak DeShawn Washington
High School Type Public Charter
High School GPA 3.62 3.21
SAT percentile 80th 85th
Volunteer Activities: American Cancer Society Local Homeless Shelter
Key Club American Heart Association
Extracurricular Activities: Chess club Student Council
Young Republicans club Student Newspaper
National Honor Society Young Democrats club
the paired conjoint condition. Respondents who were assigned to single conjoint condition
received profiles that were structured in the same way (but one at a time). It is of note that in
these profiles race was signaled through candidates’ names. For White candidate cues, first
names were selected from a list of common first names for White American men. Last names
for White respondents were selected from a list of common last names. First and last names
were then combined to form a cue for race. Similarly, first and last names for
African-American candidates were selected from a list of common first and last names for
African-Americans. They were then combined to form a race cue. Partisanship of the
candidates was signaled by a Democratic or Republican organization in the list of
extracurricular activities (presented in a random order among other two extracurricular
activities). Student’s GPA and SAT percentiles served as objective qualifications metrics. The
possible values that each attribute in the candidate profiles could take on are presented in
Table 9.
Respondents in the paired conjoint condition were asked the following questions. “On
a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 indicates ‘not strong at all’ and 7 indicates ‘very strong,’ how strong
is each of the candidates as an applicant?” Respondents were also asked “If you would have
to chose one of the candidates, which candidate would you chose to recommend for
admission?” with answer choices being “Candidate A” and “Candidate B.” Finally, for each
candidate profile respondents were asked “Would you recommend candidate [A/B] for
admission?” with answer choices being “yes” and “no.”
41
Table 9: Attributes for Candidate Profiles
Attributes Values
Race White first names: Jacob, Connor, Tanner,
Dustin, Scott, Garrett, Cody, Lucas, Logan,
Hunter
White last names: Yoder, Friedman, Krueger,
Schwartz, Schmitt, Mueller, Weiss, Novak,
O’Connell, Klein
African-American first names: DeShawn,
DeAndere, Marquis, Terrell, Malik, Tyrone,
Demetrius, Jamal, Darryl, Xavier
African-American last names: Washington,
Booker, Jefferson, Banks, Mosley, Joseph,
Jackson, Dorsey, Rivers, Batiste
High School Type Public, Private, Charter
High School GPA 3.05 – 3.85 (by increments of .01)
SAT percentile 70th, 75th, 80th, 85th, 90th, 95th, 99th
Volunteer Activities American Heart Association, American
Cancer Society, American Diabetes
Association, Lung Cancer Alliance, Red
Cross, Local Soup Kitchen, Local Homeless
Shelter, Key club
Extracurricular activities Soccer club, Tennis club, Volleyball club, The
Debate Team, Mock Trial, Student Council,
Drama club, Chess club, Book club, Marching
Band, Student Newspaper, Yearbook, National
Honor Society
Partisanship Democratic: Young Democrats club, High
School Democrats, Teenage Democrats
Republican: Young Republicans club, High
School Republicans, Teenage Republicans
Respondents in the single conjoint condition were asked similar questions with the
exception of not being asked to choose which candidate they would recommend for
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admission. Specifically, they were asked: “On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 indicates ‘not strong
at all’ and 7 indicates ‘very strong,’ how strong is this candidate as an applicant?” They were
also asked “Would you recommend this candidate for admission?”
It is noteworthy that in the paired conjoint condition one of the two candidates was
always White and the other African-American. Similarly, one of the candidates was a
Democrat and the other a Republican. In this I follow Iyengar and Westwood (2015) who in
their examination/comparison of prejudice on the basis of race and partisanship presented
respondents with profiles where one candidate was White and the other African-American or
where one candidate was Democratic and the other Republican.
I collected my data on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) sample in April of 2019.
The sample is comprised of 425 respondents. The socio-demographic characteristics of
respondents can be viewed in Table 22 in the Appendix C. Amazon Mturk data have been
shown to be at least as reliable as data obtained through other more traditional online samples
(Buhrmester, Kwang and Gosling, 2011).
Results
To estimate how each attribute impacted probability on the outcome variable, I
calculate Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs). This quantity of interest for
conjoint analysis was developed by Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto (2014), and it
represents the average effect of a particular attribute on response. Since examining how
conjoint design affects racial preferences is of major interest in this research, I restrict my
analysis to White respondents. This is necessary because expression of racial preferences of
White individuals (but not necessarily African-American individuals) has been shown to be
affected by social desirability pressures (Iyengar and Westwood, 2015). This leaves me with a
sample size of 2,640 in the paired conjoint and sample size of 2,500 in the single conjoint
condition (132 and 125 respondents, respectively).
Paired Conjoint v. Single Conjoint
I first examine whether presenting respondents with pairs of profiles, as opposed to a
set of single profiles, affects their responses by comparing results for respondents in the paired
conjoint and single conjoint condition. For this analysis I look at AMCEs for two questions:
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whether each candidate was rated as strong,15 and whether respondents would recommend
each candidate for admission. The results are presented in Figures 5 and 6. In the figures,
point estimates represent an estimated effect of a particular attribute on response (ACMEs).
Horizontal bars running through the estimates represent 95% confidence intervals around
those bars. The vertical dashed lines at 0.0 on the x-axis represent the baseline. If the 95%
confidence interval around the estimate do not cross this vertical line, the AMCE is significant
at p < .05 level.
Figures 5 and 6 show that preferences on the basis of race are unaffected by whether
respondents were presented with and answered questions about pairs of profiles or a set of
single profiles. In both, the paired conjoint and single conjoint condition, White respondents
were not more likely to recommend African-American candidates than White candidates for
admission. Similarly, White respondents were not more likely to rate African-American
candidates (in comparison to White candidates) as strong applicants. Difference of means
tests show that race ACMEs in the paired conjoint and single conjoint condition for these two
questions are not statistically significantly different from each other (p = .14 for selecting a
candidate question, and p = .55 for rating candidate as strong question).
Respondents’ partisan preferences were also unaffected by whether they were
presented with pairs of candidate profiles, or a set of single conjoint profiles. In the paired
conjoint condition respondents were 6.14% less likely to select an opposing partisan in
comparison to a co-partisan candidate (statistically significant at p < .05 level). In the single
conjoint condition respondents were 5.66% less likely to select an opposing partisan than a
co-partisan candidate (statistically significant at p < .05 level). The two estimates are not
statistically significantly different from each other (p = .87). Moreover, in the paired conjoint
15Though respondents answered the question of how strong each candidate was on a scale 1 to 7, responses
to this question were dichotomized. If responses were above the midpoint, they were coded as 1 (representing
respondents rating a candidate as strong). If the responses were below the midpoint they were coded as 0
(representing respondents not rating a candidate as strong). Responses at the midpoint were excluded from this
analysis. In this I follow (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014) for estimating ACMEs for a continuous outcome
variable. This results in a sample size of 2,309 in the paired conjoint condition and 2,128 in the single conjoint
condition for this question. To offset potential concerns, I repeat the analysis presented in Figure 6 without
dichotomizing the rating candidate as strong variable. These results are presented in Figure 13 in the Appendix
C. They are substantively similar to those presented here. However, it is noteworthy that not dichotomizing the
dependent variable changes the interpretation of results from change in probability to change in the rating.
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Figure 5: AMCEs for Selecting Each Candidate
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Figure 6: AMCEs for Rating Candidate as Strong
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condition respondents were about 4.32% less likely to rate an opposing partisan candidate (in
comparison to a co-partisan candidate) as strong (significant at p < .05 level). In the single
conjoint condition, respondents were 5.86% less likely to rate an opposing partisan candidate
as strong (significant at p < .05 level). The partisanship ACMEs for likelihood of rating a
candidate as strong question are not statistically significantly different from each other in the
paired conjoint and single conjoint condition (at p = .55).
In regards to preferences based on more objective qualifications, for selecting a
candidate question, three out of seven AMCEs for High School GPA were higher for selecting
a candidate in the single conjoint condition, in comparison to the paired conjoint condition
(all statistically significant at p < .05 level). For the rating candidate as strong question, four
out of seven AMCEs for GPA were statistically significantly higher in the single conjoint in
comparison to the paired conjoint condition (at p < .05 level). Overall, the difference of
means tests for GPA AMCEs in the paired conjoint and single conjoint conditions offer some
evidence that respondents rely on GPA for their judgments to a greater extent in the single
conjoint than the paired conjoint condition.
Next, I examine preferences based on SAT score percentiles. Not surprisingly,
preferences based on SAT score are positively related to likelihood of selecting a candidate
and likelihood or rating a candidate as strong. This is evident by generally higher AMCEs for
higher SAT percentiles in Figure 5 and 6. The difference of means tests, however, indicate
that SAT AMCEs for these two questions are never statistically significantly different form
each other in the paired conjoint and single conjoint condition (at p < .05 level).
None of the extracurricular or volunteer activities increase the chance of a candidate
being selected or likelihood of them being rated as strong. Moreover, for the exception of the
Red Cross (for both questions), none of the AMCEs for extracurricular and volunteer
activities are statistically significantly different in the paired conjoint and single conjoint
condition (at p < .05 level). Similarly, the type of school respondent went to did not
statistically significantly change the likelihood of a candidate being selected or likelihood of a
candidate being rated as strong. The AMCEs for school type were not statistically
significantly different from each other in the paired conjoint and single conjoint condition (at
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p < .05 level). Thus, presenting respondents with pairs of profiles as opposed to single
profiles was inconsequential for preferences based on respondents’ school type,
extracurricular, and volunteer activities.
In sum, random assignment of respondents to evaluate either single profiles or paired
conjoint profiles had no effect on the weight that respondents placed on racial, partisan,
volunteer, extracurricular, school type, and SAT score considerations. However, respondents
who evaluated single conjoint profiles placed a greater weight on some GPA ranges in
comparison to respondents who evaluated pairs of conjoint profiles. This pattern held for both
selecting a candidate and rating candidate as strong questions.
Forced-choice v. Selection Question for Each Candidate
Having examined how presenting respondents with pairs of profiles as opposed to a set
of single conjoint profiles affects their responses, I now turn to examining whether in the
paired conjoint condition forcing respondents to choose which candidate they would
recommend for admission (in comparison to asking them whether they would recommend
each candidate) affects their preferences. These results are presented in Figure 7. Recall that
presenting respondents with a pair of profiles and asking them to select one is referred to in
the literature as forced-choice conjoint or as choice-based conjoint,16 and it is the most
utilized form of conjoint analysis (Green, Krieger and Wind, 2001).
Starting with preferences on the basis of race, when respondents were asked whether
they would recommend each candidate, White respondents showed no preference to
African-American candidates, in comparison to White candidates (p = .29). However, when
respondents were forced to pick which candidate they would recommend, they were 5.43%
more likely to select African-American candidates in comparison to White candidates.
Difference of means test indicates that race AMCE for the forced-choice recommendation
question is statistically significantly different from race AMCE for recommendation question
for each candidate (at p < .05 level). In sum, in the paired conjoint condition, White
respondents showed no preference for African American candidates when they were asked
16Labeled as “forced-choice paired conjoint” in Figure 7.
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Figure 7: AMCEs for Forced-choice v. Selecting Each Candidate
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recommendation question about each candidate. However, they did show a preference for
African-American candidates when forced to choose between a White and an
African-American candidate.
In regards to preferences on the basis of partisanship, when respondents were asked
whether they would recommend each candidate for admission (in the paired conjoint
condition), respondents were 6.14% less likely to select an opposing partisan than a
co-partisan candidate (significant at p < .05 level). When respondents were forced to choose
which candidate to recommend, respondents were 14.12% less likely to select an opposing
partisan candidate, in comparison to co-partisan candidate (statistically significant at p < .05
level). A difference of means test indicates that AMCEs for the two questions are statistically
significantly different from each other at p < .05 level. Thus, forcing respondents to choose
one of the candidates, increased partisan bias.
Next, turning to candidates’ qualifications, forcing respondents to pick one of the
candidates as opposed to asking them a question about each candidate did not result in
statistically significantly different AMCEs for GPA. When it comes to preferences based on
SAT percentiles, two out of four AMCEs for SAT percentiles were higher when respondents
were forced to pick one of the two candidates (statistically significant at p < .05 level).
AMCEs for school type, extracurricular, and volunteer activities were never statistically
significantly different for the forced-choice question in comparison to question about each
candidate.
In sum, forcing respondents to pick one of the two candidates (as opposed to asking
them a selection question about each candidate) increased weight that respondents placed on
some SAT ranges, and partisan considerations. Also, when forced to choose one of the
candidates White respondents showed preference for African-American candidates. However,
White respondents did not show preference for African-American candidates when asked a
selection question about each candidate. On the other hand, forcing respondents to pick one of
the candidates, did not affect the weight that respondents placed on school type, GPA,
extracurricular, and volunteer activities.
It is of note that the analyses above include independent leaners into partisan
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categories. To offset potential concerns about how this might have affected partisan AMCEs, I
repeat these analyses while excluding independent leaners from partisan categories. The
results, which are substantively similar to those presented here, can be view by interested
readers in the Appendix C in Figure 10, 11, and 12.
Discussion and Conclusion
In this research I examined how different aspects of conjoint design affects racial
preferences, partisan preferences, and preferences on the basis of objective qualifications.
More specifically, I examined how presenting respondents with pairs of conjoint profiles, in
comparison to a set of single conjoint profiles, affects their responses. In the paired conjoint
condition, I also examined how forcing respondents to select one of the two profiles, in
comparison to asking them whether they would select each candidate, affects their responses.
I found that presenting respondents with sets of paired profiles, as opposed to a set of single
profiles, did not statistically significantly change AMCEs for race and partisanship. In the
paired conjoint condition, I also found that forcing respondents to choose one of the
candidates for recommendation, as opposed to asking respondents whether they would
recommend each, changed AMCEs for both, race and partisanship. Moreover, a single
conjoint condition resulted in higher AMCEs for some GPA ranges in comparison to a paired
conjoint condition. In the paired conjoint condition, forcing respondents to select one of the
candidates resulted in higher AMCEs for some SAT percentiles (in comparison to asking
respondents whether they would select each candidate).
In regards to preferences on the basis of race, forcing respondents to pick one of the
two candidates (as opposed to asking them questions about each) resulted in White
respondents showing statistically significant preference for African-American candidates. It is
just as noteworthy, that when asking questions about each candidate, White respondents did
not show preference for African-American candidates in either paired conjoint or single
conjoint condition. This indicates that the forced-choice question in the paired conjoint
condition results in social desirability misreporting for White respondents on the basis of race.
Moreover, previous research has argued that conjoint experiments decrease social
desirability bias because it is harder for respondents to pay attention to the whole
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manipulation (all the attributes being randomized) (Wallander, 2009), and because they give
respondents multiple reasons to justify their answer (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto,
2014). This research shows that this is not necessarily the case; the most commonly used form
of conjoint design results in statistically significant social desirability reporting, while other
types of conjoint designs do not. In other words, not all conjoint types decrease social
desirability pressures equally. Rather, some types of conjoint designs are more effective at
decreasing social desirability pressures than others.
In the work of Iyengar and Westwood (2015), which compares partisan and racial
prejudice, the authors presented respondents with pairs of candidate profiles, and forced them
to select one of the candidates. In one set of profiles, respondents had to choose between a
Democratic and a Republican candidate. In another set of profiles respondents had to choose
between an African American and a European American individual. According to social
identity theory respondents should show preference for their in-group members (Allport,
1954; Brewer, 1999; Struch and Schwartz, 1989; Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel and Turner, 1979;
Transue, 2007; De Cremer and Van Vugt, 1999; Dovidio and Gaertner, 2000). Consistent with
this expectation, the authors found that respondents showed preference for co-partisans in
comparison to opposing partisans. Contrary to expectation of social identity theory, however,
the authors found that White respondents showed preference for their racial out-group
(African-American candidates). The authors argue that this can be explained by the presence
of racial equality norms. The authors also argue that the absence of a similar norm for
partisanship ensures that partisans feel free to show preference for co-partisans (in comparison
to opposing partisans).
The work of Iyengar and Westwood (2015) contributes to affective polarization by
showing that the mass public is more divided on the basis of partisanship than on the basis
of race. However, it leaves the question open of whether social desirability pressures in the
selection task based on race were present because respondents were presented with a White
and an African-American candidate side-by-side (pairs of profiles), or because respondents
were forced to select either a White or an African-American candidate.
The evidence in this study suggests the mechanism through which social desirability
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pressures played a role in the work of Iyengar and Westwood (2015). It is because
respondents were forced to select one of the two candidates, as opposed to being presented
with a pair of profiles. The fact that forced-choice question in the paired conjoint condition
resulted in social desirability reporting, while asking respondents a question about each profile
did not result in social desirability reporting in either paired conjoint or single conjoint
condition, has important implications for future research utilizing conjoint design. It suggests
that the most widely used form of conjoint design in the social sciences and political science
specifically: forced-choice conjoint (or choice-based conjoint)–is not appropriate for the study
of sensitive topics. Researchers studying these topics can either present respondents with pairs
of profiles or a set of single profiles as long–as they ask questions about each profile.
Consistent with previous studies examining partisan bias (Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes,
2012; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Gift and Gift, 2015; Banda, Carsey and Severenchuk,
forthcoming), I find that partisans in all my tests consistently show preference for co-partisans
in comparison to opposing partisans. While some have argued that partisans feel free to show
preference for co-partisans in their behavioral judgments because of the absence of a norm of
treating co-partisans and opposing partisans equally (Iyengar and Westwood, 2015), I think
that the expressions of partisan bias are not merely regulated by the absence of partisan
equality norm, but rather by an active presence of a norm of partisan hate.17
Consider any great sports rivalry. For instance, UNC and Duke college basketball. The
behavior/attitudes of UNC basketball fans towards Duke fans is not just governed by the
absence of a norm that states that they should treat Duke fans equitably. Perhaps more
importantly, UNC students are actively socialized into a norm of hate towards Duke students.
Consequently, this norm governs behavior and attitudes of UNC fans towards Duke fans. In
an analogous way partisans are socialized into hating their partisan opponents which affects
their behavioral judgments.
The fact that respondents show more partisan bias when forced to choose between a
Democratic and a Republican candidate, in comparison to when they are asked separate
17Similarly, Hetherington and Weiler (2018) interpret the current feeling thermometer ratings that partisans
give to their opposing partisans as outright ‘political hatred.’
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questions about whether they would select each, is suggestive of a presence of a norm. It
seems that forcing respondents to make a zero-sum choice between an in-group and an
out-group member highlights the trade off, which makes salient any norms that are present. In
the case of race, respondents are more aware that they are making a zero-sum choice between
a White and an African-American candidate, which raises the saliency of racial equality norm.
In the case of partisanship, asking respondents to make a zero-sum choice between a
co-partisan and an opposing partisan seems to highlight the norm of partisan hate, which
increases partisan bias.
This study also has shown that different aspects of conjoint design can affect AMCEs
for objective candidate qualifications. It is unclear why paired conjoint condition, in
comparison to single conjoint condition, changed AMCEs for some GPA ranges, but not for
SAT percentiles. Similarly, it is unclear why, in the paired conjoint condition, forcing
respondents to choose one of the candidates, as opposed to asking respondents to answer a
question about each, affected AMCEs for SAT percentiles, but not for candidate GPAs. Future
research could examine how different types of objective qualifications are affected by conjoint
design.
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APPENDIX A: SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 1
Additional Analyses
Figure 8 and Figure 9 repeat the analyses in the body of the paper, but without
independent leaners in the partisan categories. The main takeaway from these figures is that
when leaners are excluded from the partisan categories, results are substantively similar to
those when leaners are included in the partisan categories.
Figure 8: Average Treatment Effects (ATEs)
Average Treatment Effects (ATEs) for “opposing partisan” treatment for eight evaluative questions is presented
in the left column. Similarly, ATEs for “co-partisan” treatment for the same questions is presented in the right
column. Points represent ATE estimates (calculated as the difference between average evaluation in the control
and treatment group), and horizontal bars are 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 9: Conditional Average Treatment Effects (CATEs)
Conditional Average Treatment Effects (CATEs) by levels of NFA for “opposing partisan” treatment for eight
evaluative questions is presented in the left column. Similarly, CATEs for “co-partisan” treatment for the same
questions is presented in the right column. Points represent CATE estimates (calculated as the difference
between average evaluation in the control and treatment group), and horizontal bars are 95% confidence
intervals.
Tables 10 and 11 present the full regressions corresponding to Figure 2 in the text of
the paper. Similarly, Tables 12–17 present the full regressions corresponding to Figure 2 in the
body of the paper.
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Table 10: Average Treatment Effects (ATEs) in Evaluative Questions Part 1
Open-Minded Selection Qualified Trustworthy
Co-partisan 0.020∗∗ 0.010 0.014# 0.015∗
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007)
Opposing partisan −0.044∗∗ −0.038∗∗ −0.028∗∗ −0.022∗∗
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007)
Constant 0.645∗∗ 0.700∗∗ 0.654∗∗ 0.670∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Observations 4,277 4,277 4,277 4,277
Note: #p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01
Table 11: Average Treatment Effects (ATEs) in Evaluative Questions Part 2
Ethical Intelligent Competent Hardworking
Co-partisan 0.018∗ 0.015∗ 0.023∗∗ 0.019∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Opposing partisan −0.020∗∗ −0.017∗ −0.012 −0.007
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Constant 0.654∗∗ 0.674∗∗ 0.663∗∗ 0.676∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Observations 4,277 4,277 4,277 4,277
Note: #p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01
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Table 12: In-group and Out-group Partisan Bias for Respondents Low on NFA Part 1
Open-Minded Selection Qualified Trustworthy
Co-partisan 0.025∗ 0.015 0.013 0.016
(0.013) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013)
Opposing partisan −0.014 −0.032∗ −0.026# −0.013
(0.013) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013)
Constant 0.627∗∗ 0.696∗∗ 0.660∗∗ 0.642∗∗
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021)
Observations 1,365 1,365 1,365 1,365
Note: #p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01
Table 13: In-group and Out-group Partisan Bias for Respondents Low on NFA Part 2
Ethical Intelligent Competent Hardworking
Co-partisan 0.019 0.017 0.020 0.029∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Opposing partisan −0.005 −0.012 0.005 0.005
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Constant 0.624∗∗ 0.641∗∗ 0.642∗∗ 0.644∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Observations 1,365 1,365 1,365 1,365
Note: #p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01
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Table 14: In-group and Out-group Partisan Bias for Respondents Medium on NFA Part 1
Open-Minded Selection Qualified Trustworthy
Co-partisan 0.032∗∗ 0.020 0.024# 0.029∗
(0.012) (0.016) (0.013) (0.012)
Opposing partisan −0.029∗ −0.026# −0.014 −0.026∗
(0.012) (0.016) (0.013) (0.012)
Constant 0.612∗∗ 0.668∗∗ 0.622∗∗ 0.648∗∗
(0.018) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018)
Observations 1,561 1,561 1,561 1,561
Note: #p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01
Table 15: In-group and Out-group Partisan Bias for Respondents Medium on NFA Part 2
Ethical Intelligent Competent Hardworking
Co-partisan 0.029∗ 0.022# 0.045∗∗ 0.027∗
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Opposing partisan −0.015 −0.015 −0.006 0.002
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Constant 0.617∗∗ 0.665∗∗ 0.633∗∗ 0.651∗∗
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
Observations 1,561 1,561 1,561 1,561
Note: #p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01
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Table 16: In-group and Out-group Partisan Bias for Respondents High on NFA Part 1
Open-Minded Selection Qualified Trustworthy
Co-partisan −0.001 −0.009 0.0001 −0.004
(0.012) (0.016) (0.014) (0.012)
Opposing partisan −0.095∗∗ −0.063∗∗ −0.051∗∗ −0.030∗
(0.013) (0.016) (0.014) (0.012)
Constant 0.700∗∗ 0.741∗∗ 0.686∗∗ 0.724∗∗
(0.019) (0.021) (0.019) (0.018)
Observations 1,351 1,351 1,351 1,351
Note: #p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01
Table 17: In-group and Out-group Partisan Bias for Respondents High on NFA Part 2
Ethical Intelligent Competent Hardworking
Co-partisan 0.001 0.001 −0.001 −0.005
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Opposing partisan −0.043∗∗ −0.029∗ −0.038∗∗ −0.034∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
Constant 0.727∗∗ 0.718∗∗ 0.721∗∗ 0.739∗∗
(0.019) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
Observations 1,351 1,351 1,351 1,351
Note: #p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01
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Table 18: Do Respondents in Low, Medium, and High NFA Group Show Statistically Significantly
Different Magnitude of Bias from Each-other Part 1
Open-Minded Selection Qualified Ethical
Medium on NFA −0.005 0.008 −0.011 −0.003
(0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.021)
High on NFA 0.092∗∗ 0.095∗∗ 0.066∗∗ 0.097∗∗
(0.022) (0.021) (0.019) (0.022)
Co-Partisan −0.001 −0.007 0.002 0.001
(0.013) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013)
Co-partisan 0.026 0.022 0.011 0.019
× Low on NFA (0.018) (0.023) (0.020) (0.018)
Co-partisan 0.032# 0.026 0.022 0.027
× Medium on NFA (0.017) (0.022) (0.019) (0.017)
Opposing partisan −0.012 −0.029# −0.024# −0.006
(0.013) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013)
Opposing partisan −0.016 0.002 0.010 −0.009
× Medium on NFA (0.018) (0.022) (0.019) (0.017)
Opposing partisan −0.082∗∗ −0.034 −0.025 −0.037∗
× High on NFA (0.018) (0.023) (0.020) (0.018)
Constant 0.617∗∗ 0.667∗∗ 0.637∗∗ 0.624∗∗
(0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017)
Observations 4,277 4,277 4,277 4,277
Note: #p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01
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Table 19: Do Respondents in Low, Medium, and High NFA Group Show Statistically Significantly
Different Magnitude of Bias from Each-other Part 2
Trustworthy Intelligent Competent Hardworking
Medium on NFA 0.001 0.016 −0.012 0.016
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020)
High on NFA 0.087∗∗ 0.100∗∗ 0.090∗∗ 0.112∗∗
(0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Co-partisan −0.003 0.002 0.0001 −0.003
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Co-partisan × Low on NFA 0.019 0.015 0.020 0.033#
× Low on NFA (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
Co-partisan 0.031# 0.020 0.044∗ 0.030#
× Medium on NFA (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017)
Opposing partisan −0.013 −0.011 0.006 0.008
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Opposing partisan −0.013 −0.004 −0.012 −0.005
× Medium on NFA (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
Opposing partisan −0.017 −0.018 −0.042∗ −0.041∗
× High on NFA (0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.018)
Constant 0.642∗∗ 0.636∗∗ 0.639∗∗ 0.635∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Observations 4,277 4,277 4,277 4,277
Note: #p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01
NFA Instrument
The original NFA battery was developed by Maio and Esses (2001) consisted of 26
items. I construct the NFA battery from 8 items that loaded high in factor analysis on this
original battery. The seven items combined using a summated rating model. They formed a
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reliable index (α = .77). Some items were revere-coded so that higher numbers represent
higher NFA. The final index was rescaled to range from 0 to 1. The seven questions used for
this battery are presented below. Answer choices for each question ranged on a 7-point scale
from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.”
1. “I do not know how to handle my emotions, so I avoid them,”
2. “I find strong emotions overwhelming and therefore try to avoid them,”
3. “Emotions are dangerous—they tend to get me into situations that I would rather
avoid,”
4. “I would prefer not to experience either the lows or highs of emotion.” item “Emotions
help people get along in life”
5. “It is important for me to be in touch with my feelings,”
6. “I think that it is important to explore my feelings,”
7. “It is important for me to know how others are feeling.”
Candidate Prompts
Nonprofit Activist Candidate
The following section provides sample candidate prompts along with a brief discussion.18
Starting with a candidate for nonprofit organization, respondents were asked to evaluate a
community activist for a nonprofit organization. For instance, below is a sample profile for
Democratic candidates. For Republican candidates, “College Democrats” was replaced with
“College Republicans.” For nonpartisan candidates, “College Democrats” was replaced with
“Voter Turnout Drive.”





Bachelor of Arts in Economics
GPA: 3.12
Relevant Work Experience:
18An example sample of CFO candidate prompt was provided in the text.
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Non-profit community education organization (2 years)








Respondents were also asked to evaluate a candidate for a research assistant position in a
research organization focused on effective philanthropy. For instance, below is a sample
profile for Democratic candidates. For Republican candidates, “College Democrats” was
replaced with “College Republicans.” For nonpartisan candidates, “College Democrats” was
replaced with “Voter Turnout Drive.”
Below is a profile of a candidate for a research assistant position at a research




Bachelor of Arts in Statistics, May 2017
GPA 3.14
Relevant Work Experience:








Respondents also evaluated a candidate for a secretary position in the office of a College
Dean. For instance, below is a sample profile for Democratic candidates. For Republican
candidates, “County Democratic Headquarters” was replaced with “County Republican
Headquarters.” For nonpartisan candidates, “County Democratic Headquarters” was replaced
with “Voter Turnout Campaign.”





Bachelor of Arts in English Literature, May 2017
GPA 3.13
Relevant Work Experience:
Secretary at Brooks Law (2 years 1 month)





Respondents also evaluated a candidate for a campus award that was given to a student who
successfully got students involved in philanthropy. For instance, below is a sample prompt for
Democratic candidates. For Republican candidates, “College Democrats” was replaced with
“College Republicans.” Nonpartisan candidates had the same profile, for the exception of
campus involvement listing “The Blood Drive” and another randomly selected college
activity.
Below is a profile of a candidate for a student award at a local state university. This














George Taylor was heavily involved in organizing the Blood Drive on campus last fall.
George along with a team of students was able to contribute to a 5% increase in blood
donations in comparison to previous year.
19Since secretary prompt is not gender neutral, instead of randomly picking a name from a pool of generic
American male names, I chose to assign a gender neutral name,“Casey Smith” to this candidate prompt.
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Scholarship Candidate
Respondents also evaluated a candidate for a scholarship awarded to students who want to
study communications, and go into career in public relations after college.
For instance, below is a sample profile for Democratic candidate. For Republican
candidates “Young Democrats Club” was replaced with “Young Republicans Club.” For
nonpartisan candidates, “Young Democrats Club” was replaced with “Civics Club.”
Below is a profile of a candidate for a $10,000 college scholarship which can be used at a
college of a student’s choice. This scholarship is awarded to students who want to study
communication, and go into career in public relations after college. The winner of the
scholarship is eligible to receive the award for four years in the row, conditional on them




High School Honors Diploma (in progress)
GPA: 3.42
Honors/AP Courses:








For the internship experiment, respondents were asked to evaluate a candidate for Google’s
Marketing and Communications internship. For instance, below is a profile for Democratic
candidates. For Republican candidates “College Democrats” was replaced with “College
Republicans.” For nonpartisan candidates, “College Democrats” was replaced with “Voter
Turnout Drive.”


















APPENDIX B: SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 2
Results for partisans only (independent leaners dropped)
Table 20: Candidate Evaluations in Non-political and Political Setting (without leaners)
Select Qualified Trustworthy Ethical
Co-partisan 0.014 0.021∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.020∗∗
(0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Partisan opp. −0.040∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Political setting −0.004 0.0003 −0.013 −0.013
(0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014)
Co-partisan × −0.002 −0.016 −0.011 −0.002
Political setting (0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011)
Partisan opp. × 0.019 0.007 −0.006 0.002
Political setting (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011)
Constant 0.698∗∗∗ 0.647∗∗∗ 0.673∗∗∗ 0.667∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Observations (N) 6,832 6,832 6,832 6,832
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
68
Table 21: Candidate Evaluations in Non-political and Political Setting (without leaners)
Intelligent Open-minded Competent Hardworking
Co-partisan 0.014∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Partisan opp. −0.018∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗ −0.012 −0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Political setting −0.016 −0.008 −0.024∗ −0.013
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Co-partisan × 0.004 −0.010 −0.009 −0.010
Political setting (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Partisan opp. × 0.005 0.013 0.005 −0.001
Political setting (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Constant 0.679∗∗∗ 0.654∗∗∗ 0.670∗∗∗ 0.679∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Observations (N) 6,832 6,832 6,832 6,832
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Candidate Prompts
CFO Candidate
The following section provides sample candidate prompts along with a brief discussion.
Starting with the CFO candidate, below is a profile shown to respondents in the non-political
setting condition. Respondents assigned to evaluate a CFO candidate in the political setting
received the same prompt except “local business” was replaced with ”city government. While
the prompt below is for a Democratic candidate, for a Republican candidate “County
Democratic Headquarters” was replaced with “County Republican Headquarters.” For
candidates with non-partisan cue, “County Democratic Headquarters” was replaced with
“Voter Turnout Campaign.”






Bachelor of Arts in Economics (GPA 3.17)
MBA (GPA: 3.46)
Relevant Work Experience:
Corporate accountant at Wells Fargo (5 years)





Respondents were also asked to evaluate a candidate for nonprofit organization. Respondents
were asked to either evaluate a community activist for a nonprofit or a political nonprofit
organization. Respondents assigned to a non-political setting condition were presented with
the prompt shown below. Respondents assigned to a political condition received the same
prompt except the word “political” was added before “non-profit.” The prompt below is for a
Democratic candidate. For Republican candidates, “College Democrats” was replaced with
“College Republicans.” For candidates with no partisan cue, “College Democrats” was
replaced with “Voter Turnout Drive.”





Bachelor of Arts in Economics
GPA: 3.42
Relevant Work Experience:
Non-profit community education organization (2 years)









Respondents were also asked to evaluate a candidate for a research assistant position in a
research organization focused on either effective philanthropy or on public policy
(non-political and political setting, respectively). Those assigned to a non-political condition
were presented with the candidate profile below. Respondents assigned to evaluate a research
assistant in the political setting received the same candidate profile with the exception of
“effective philanthropy” being replaced with “public policy.” The prompt below is for a
Democratic candidate. For Republican candidates “College Democrats” was replaced with
“College Republicans.” For candidates with no partisan cue, “College Democrats” was
replaced with “Voter Turnout Drive.”
Below is a profile of a candidate for a research assistant position at a research




Bachelor of Arts in Statistics, May 2017
GPA 3.42
Relevant Work Experience:








Respondents also evaluated a candidate for a secretary position. Those assigned to a political
setting condition evaluated a secretary candidate for a position in a State Representative’s
office. For the non-political setting, respondents evaluated a secretary candidate for a position
in the office of a College Dean. Below is a prompt shown to those in the non-political
condition. The prompt below is for Democratic candidates, for Republican candidates
“County Democratic Headquarters” was replaced with “County Republican Headquarters.”
For candidates with no partisan cue, “County Democratic Headquarters” was replaced with
“Voter Turnout Campaign.”





Bachelor of Arts in English Literature, May 2017
GPA 3.42
Relevant Work Experience:
Secretary at Brooks Law (2 years 1 month)





Respondents also evaluated a candidate for a campus award (either in the political or the
non-political setting). In a political setting respondents evaluated a candidate nominated for
an award that is given to a student who successfully got students involved in politics. Those
assigned to a non-political setting condition evaluated a candidate nominated for an award that
is given to a student who successfully got students involved in philanthropy.
For instance, below is a prompt shown to respondents assigned to a non-political
setting. Respondents assigned to the political setting condition received the same prompt with
the exception of the following. The award description section at the top of the profile stated
that the student had successfully gotten peers involved in “local elections” instead of
“philanthropy.” Under the campus involvement section, “The Blood Drive” was replaced with
”Voter Turnout Drive.” Also, the reason for nomination section stated: “[candidate full name]
was heavily involved in organizing a Voter Turnout Drive before the last presidential election
on campus. [candidate first name], along with a team of students were able to contribute to a
5% increase in voter registrations among the student body in comparison to the previous
election.”
The prompt below is for Democratic candidates, for Republican candidates, “College
Democrats” being replaced with “College Republicans.” For candidates with no partisan cue,
campus involvement listed “Voter Turnout Drive,” and another randomly selected
20Since secretary prompt is not gender neutral, instead of randomly picking a name from a pool of generic
American male names, I chose to assign a gender neutral name,“Casey Smith” to this candidate prompt.
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non-political activity. It is of note that while in the other profiles, (when applicable) campus
activities were randomized from a pool of activities. In this experiment, however, “Voter
Turnout Drive” was paired with the political setting condition, and “The Blood Drive” was
paired with the non-political setting condition (the rest of the activities were randomly
selected as usual).
Below is a profile of a candidate for a student award at a local state university. This














George Taylor was heavily involved in organizing the Blood Drive on campus last fall.
George, along with a team of students was able to contribute to a 5% increase in blood
donations in comparison to previous year.
Scholarship Candidate
For a college scholarship, those assigned to the political setting condition evaluated a
candidate for a scholarship awarded to students who wanted to study political science, and go
into a career in politics after college. Those assigned to the non-political setting condition
evaluated a candidate for a scholarship awarded to students who want to study
communications, and go into career in public relations after college. Those assigned to the
political cue condition received the same prompt, with the exception of “study
communication, and go into a career in public relations” being replaced with “study political
science, and go into career in politics,” in the award description at the top of the profile.
For instance, below is a prompt shown to respondents in the non-political setting
condition. The prompt below is for Democratic candidates, for Republican candidates,
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“Young Democrats Club” was replaced with “Young Republicans Club.” For neutral
candidates, “Young Democrats Club” was replaced with “Civics Club.”
Below is a profile of a candidate for a $10,000 college scholarship which can be used at a
college of a student’s choice. This scholarship is awarded to students who want to study
communication, and go into a career in public relations after college. The winner of the
scholarship is eligible to receive the award for four years in the row, conditional on them




High School Honors Diploma (in progress)
GPA: 3.72
Honors/AP Courses:








For the internship experiment, respondents were asked to evaluate a candidate for a Marketing
and Communications Internship in Silicon Valley or for a Marketing and Communications
Internship on Capitol Hill (non-political and political setting respectively). For instance below
is a profile shown to those assigned to the non-political condition. Respondents assigned to a
political setting condition received the same prompt, with the exception of “Google’s” being
replaces with ”Congressional” at the top of the profile. The prompt below is for a Democratic
candidate. For Republican candidates, “College Democrats” was replaced with “College
Republicans.” For candidates with no partisan cue, “College Democrats” was replaced with
“Voter Turnout Drive.”


















APPENDIX C: SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 3
Additional Analyses
Figures 10–12 repeat the same analysis at that presented in Figures 5, 6, and 7 in the
body of the paper, but exclude leaners from the partisan categories. Figure 13 repeats the
analysis in Figure 6, but without dichotomizing rating candidate as strong variable. When this
measure is not dichotomized the interpretation changes from change in probability, to change
in the rating (with 0 being ‘not very strong’ and 1 ’very strong’). However, substantive results
in Figure 13 are similar to those in Figure 6. Namely, whether respondents were randomized
to evaluate single profiles or pairs of profiles was inconsequential for the weight that
respondents placed on the following considerations: race, partisanship, school type, SAT
scores, volunteer, and extracurricular activities (at p < .05 level). On the other hand,
respondents who were randomized to evaluate single profiles placed greater weight on some
GPA ranges.
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Figure 10: AMCEs for Selecting Each Candidate
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Figure 11: AMCEs for Rating Candidate as Strong
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Figure 12: AMCEs for Forced-choice v. Selecting Each Candidate
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Figure 13: AMCEs for Rating Candidate as Strong (Without Dichotomizing the Dependent Variable)
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African American 30 7.06
Hispanic 37 8.71
Asian 32 7.53











≥ 65 6 1.41
Education
< High School 1 0.24
High School/GED 39 9.18
Some college 90 21.18
2 year degree 44 10.35
4 year degree 188 44.24
Masters 48 11.29
Doctorate 0 0
Professional (JD/MD) 8 1.88
Party ID
Strong Democrat 103 24.58
Weak Democrat 100 23.87
Lean Democratic 42 10.02
Pure Independent 52 12.41
Lean Republican 28 6.68
Weak Republican 42 10.02
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Mummendey, Amélie and Sabine Otten. 2001. “Aversive discrimination.” Blackwell
handbook of social psychology: Intergroup processes pp. 112–132.
88
Mummolo, Jonathan. 2016. “News from the Other Side: How Topic Relevance Limits the
Prevalence of Partisan Selective Exposure.” The Journal of Politics 78(3):763–773.
URL: https://doi.org/10.1086/685584
Mummolo, Jonathan and Clayton Nall. 2017. “Why Partisans Do Not Sort: The Constraints
on Political Segregation.” The Journal of Politics 79(1):45–59.
URL: https://doi.org/10.1086/687569
Nicholson, Stephen P, Chelsea M Coe, Jason Emory and Anna V Song. 2016. “The politics
of beauty: The effects of partisan bias on physical attractiveness.” Political Behavior
38(4):883–898.
Oakes, Penelope J. 1987. “The salience of social categories.” Rediscovering the social
group: A self-categorization theory pp. 117–141.
Oliveros, Virginia and Christian Schuster. 2018. “Merit, tenure, and bureaucratic behavior:
Evidence from a conjoint experiment in the Dominican Republic.” Comparative Political
Studies 51(6):759–792.
Ono, Yoshikuni and Barry C Burden. 2018. “The contingent effects of candidate sex on voter
choice.” Political Behavior pp. 1–25.
Peterson, Erik. 2017. “The Role of the Information Environment in Partisan Voting.” The
Journal of Politics 79(4):1191–1204.
URL: https://doi.org/10.1086/692740
Peterson, Erik and Gabor Simonovits. 2018. “The Electoral Consequences of Issue Frames.”
The Journal of Politics 80(4):1283–1296.
URL: https://doi.org/10.1086/698886
Phelps, Elizabeth A, Sam Ling and Marisa Carrasco. 2006. “Emotion facilitates perception
and potentiates the perceptual benefits of attention.” Psychological science 17(4):292–
299.
Phillips, Chelsea and Thomas M. Carsey. 2013. The Power and Influence of Political
Identities Beyond Political Contexts. In APSA 2013 Annual Meeting Paper.
Pieters, Rik and Michel Wedel. 2004. “Attention capture and transfer in advertising: Brand,
pictorial, and text-size effects.” Journal of Marketing 68(2):36–50.
Poole, Keith T and Howard Rosenthal. 1997. Congress: A political-economic history of roll
call voting. Oxford University Press on Demand.
Puglise, Nicole. 2016. “Family feud, election edition: Americans brace for Thanksgiving
discord.” The Guardian .
Raghavarao, Damaraju, James B Wiley and Pallavi Chitturi. 2011. “Choice-based conjoint
analysis.” Models and Designs (1st ed.). Boca Raton: Taylor and Frances Group .
Ryan, Timothy J, Matthew S Wells and Brice DL Acree. 2016. “Emotional responses to
disturbing political news: The role of personality.” Journal of Experimental Political
Science 3(2):174–184.
89
Sances, Michael W. 2018. “Ideology and vote choice in US Mayoral elections: evidence
from facebook surveys.” Political Behavior 40(3):737–762.
Scoby, Ashley. 2018. “I’m Not Seeing My Trump-Loving Family On Christmas And I
Couldn’t Be Happier About It.” Huffpost .
Sen, Maya. 2017. “How political signals affect public support for judicial nominations:
Evidence from a conjoint experiment.” Political Research Quarterly 70(2):374–393.
Shor, Boris and Nolan McCarty. 2011. “The ideological mapping of American legislatures.”
American Political Science Review 105(3):530–551.
Stonecash, Jeffrey M, Mark D Brewer and Mack D Mariani. 2003. Diverging parties: Social
change, realignment, and party polarization. Westview Press.
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